Judging by recent speeches made by the President and the Secretary of State, neither is listening very closely to the other. Dulles sat right behind his chief at Eisenhower's address to the Colombo Plan nations in Seattle November 10, but maybe the public address system was out of whack.

Exactly a week later Dulles warned the neutral nations that they were staring Communist takeover in the face. Moreover, their dalliance with the Soviets and their rejection of Western collective security measures might change their new-found independence to nothing more than "a brief interlude between the rule of colonialism and the harsh dictatorship of Communism."

The President, speaking to a relatively similar audience, had used the same theme, but with a more positive tone. To him there seemed to be no evil inherent in neutralism; in fact, he stressed the necessity for strength in the new countries, not the necessity of their joining Western military alliances.

"(Our) goal," he said, "is to enable free nations to achieve a momentum of economic progress which will make it possible for them to go forward in self-reliant growth." But the divergence in the two policy outlooks is at least as striking as the difference between Eisenhower's professed aims and the policies he will seek to attain them. "The United States," he said, "will press these measures energetically, consistent with the maintenance of a sound domestic economy." (Italics ours.)

Point Four Extension

The ideals expressed--essentially reaffirmations of Point Four--could have been interpreted as an extension of America's commitment to further the economic and political strength of the newly free, underdeveloped nations. Unfortunately, the President's qualifications to this commitment render his program unconvincing. Just as in his first post-election conference he intoned his economizing refrain, "I think every place we are spending too much money," his Colombo talk was characterized by financial cowardice.

Now no one would deny that economic assistance relies on the "maintenance of a sound domestic economy," but in the interpretation of "sound" lies the difference between a successful program in Asia and Africa or another failure. The President's version of a sound economy precludes the proper scope in expenditures for technical assistance projects, "bankable" loans and loans whose eventual repayment is doubtful. Yet it is on these outlays, as well as in tariff reductions and private capital, that success in Asia and Africa depends.

That the threat to the new nations is a real one should already be clear, though recent reports from Russia by Walter Lippmann and Adlai Stevenson delineate the immense extent of Communist appeal to the world's underdeveloped areas. To answer the Soviet challenge with half-way measures, such as the President has cited, or with threats on the order of Secretary Dulles' pronunciamento seems the height of folly.

Lippmann, obviously impressed by Khrushchev's plans to switch Russia's grain-producing area from the Ukraine to Siberia, recommends that the United States prove--through an intensive agricultural and industrial program in India--that it can match Soviet and Chinese performance. Stevenson was more cautious about the possibility of failure for the Kremlin's grand Seven-Year Plan, but admitted the propaganda effect of such undertakings on nations which can see what Communism has done in forty years in Russia and in ten years in China.

India: A "Showcase"

In stressing the importance of making India a "showcase" for democracy's industrial potential, Lippmann may be overemphasizing the sub-continent's value as a propaganda display. Certainly the problems in India are immense and the strategic value of the area cannot be overestimated. It would, however, be unfortunate to concentrate all our efforts in India at the expense of other Asian and African nations equally vulnerable to Communist appeal.

Wherever or however the challenge is met, it seems apparent from the statements by the President and the Secretary that they are not ready to meet it properly. The initiative for action therefore falls to the Congress, that Congress of "spenders" and "radicals." Seldom has a legislature been called on to formulate a policy of such scope, but seldom has the need for such a policy been so compelling.

If the President cannot realize that inadequate expenditures for development programs are even more wasteful than no expenditure at all, the Congress must. The United States cannot afford to gamble that Russia and China will suddenly collapse or that Khrushchev's ambitious plans will turn into colossal failures. To meet the appeal of Communism's economic successes, we must demonstrate the vitality of a democratic system. Unless the Congress will undertake to plan this demonstration, the free world stands to lose the 900 million people of the uncommitted nations. The West cannot afford such a loss.