Harold Stassen, if he does nothing else in a political career singular for its proportion of frustration, will at least have forced one of the most important policy decisions of this Administration. Sometime this week, as a result of his disagreements with Secretary Dulles, Stassen will be able to present his views on disarmament to the National Security Council.

Unfortunately, Stassen has very few concrete proposals to counter the "sit-tight" attitude of his chief antagonist. The President, himself, is looking for something as spectacular as his "open-skies" or atoms-for-peace plans with which to counter Premier Bulganin's pre-NATO-Conference call for a summit meeting. Unless Stassen can come up with a suitably electrifying proposal, he will find it well-nigh impossible to break through the Administration's massive complacency.

An appearance of complacency, of course, can mean two different things: either we're so sure of ourselves that we don't have to move, or we're so frightened we can't. With the release of the Rockefeller Report and the failure to release the Gaither Report, it would appear that the second estimate of our posture is the more realistic.

If we are too scared to speak, our allies are so scared that they are all speaking at once. Prime Minister Mac-millan's recent suggestion of an East-West non-agression pact is tangible evidence that the glow of confidence and unity of purpose permeating the NATO meeting was artificial and ephemeral. In itself, Macmillan's idea is harmless and could even prove worthwhile if it stimulates eventual top-level disarmament discussion.

A non-agression pact, however, does not seem an adequate answer to the disarmament impasse. While somewhat more substantial than the Dullesian criteria for Russian expressions of good-will (e.g., an end to the Soviet drive to "subvert independent countries"), the British idea cannot produce any lasting disarmament agreement by itself and may not even be sufficient as a first step.

The one basis for agreement at the moment is a pact to halt nuclear tests. Whether such action be taken in the expanded United Nations Disarmament Commission, at a foreign ministers' meeting, or at the summit, it would represent the best antidote to the present tension. Although AEC Chairman Strauss has kept up a constant campaign in favor of the tests, his stand can be overruled and he may well be out of a job in June. It will be a more difficult job to unfreeze John Foster Dulles, but even he cannot sit tight forever in a world that is constantly moving.