The type of label-thinking which has characterized this country's official view towards the Soviet Union is becoming too costly to maintain. There is a certain stage at which open hostility and cynicism towards one's enemies begins to pay diminishing returns. Senator George expressed the fear last week that United States foreign policy has reached and passed this point. He criticized America's "universally adamant and negative attitude" towards Russia, an attitude that is causing our foreign friends to wonder just how valuable, or how profitable, our friendship really is.

Perhaps the current American reaction of automatic skepticism towards everything that Russia does or says or promises is a natural after-effect of the Great Awakening, the days when the U.S. first recognized the meaning behind Stalin's smiles. From an unjustified good faith in Russia's intentions, America leaped into fear and a deep contempt for the new Enemy, instead of assuming a proper attitude of caution and watchful reserve. As a result, the official American response to Soviet peace antics has been reflexive denouncement and obvious bad faith.

In reaction to Soviet offers to confer, the U.S. answers with despairing pessimism instead of cautious optimism. When Russia announced her arms cut, Secretary Dulles, a man of few and ill-chosen words, responded that "the obvious explanation" is as a propaganda tactic and a shift of manpower to industry and agriculture. This all may be true enough, but the Secretary's hasty appraisal is not the way to counter the Soviet gambit. Countries keeping an appraising eye on the two world foes see perpetual Russian smiles and perpetual American frowns. They are presented by the Kremlin with a fait accompli, a reduction of arms and men in arms. Expecting to see the West follow with some sort of similar action, they see only the scowling countenance of Mr. Dulles, scoffing, skeptical, facilely explaining the not-so-obvious.

This kind of narrow pre-judgment of Russia with which the U.S. faces the world can do this country little good. It is perhaps more dangerous than naivete, because it characterizes America as stubborn, dogmatic, and incredulous. A portrait painted in such colors clashes harshly with the glib flatteries and broad grins of Moscow's Abbott and Costello, and also with just such Russian ploys as the armaments reduction. America becomes the conservative and unimaginative, Russia appears the innovator, the offerer, the fair-haired caretaker of the peace dove.

The State Department would do well to be more subtle in its public utterances. It may evaluate Russia as it sees fit, but to the world, the United States must appear hopeful, creative, positive, and always willing to meet the Kremlin half-way. Unless the U.S. consciously attempts to create this attitude, the country may too soon learn how to lose friends and alienate people.