The Soviets have once again put off their peace-loving masks and crushed the nascent free state of Hungary. Their protestations of good intentions toward all mankind apparently are sincere only when the terms of the peace suit them.

In an age threatened by thermonuclear weapons, any action by the free nations must be carefully thought out, and the advantages it implies weighed against the possibility of precipitating a Third World War, a war that would be so horrible as to render trifling by comparison the Russians' brutal treatment of the Hungarian patriots. With a deep sense of regret it must be conceded that a morally demanded defense of embattled Hungary is not worth a Third World War and its havoc to man kind.

Therefore demands for armed United States intervention in Hungary against Russia must be disregarded. Such action would seem to the Soviets to be clear aggression, and Soviet reaction is more significant here than is our own moral justification of action. If they felt themselves the victims of aggression, the Russians would respond in kind, and because they now seem tense and insecure, their reaction could well lead to far more than another Korea.

United Nations intervention might appear to the Soviets to be less of a direct attack, but this could only be true if none of her familiar Western big-power antagonists were among the interveners, and would not then be sure. But it is highly questionable whether an effective force could be amalgamated from the other U.N. countries, especially when it is considered that the Egyptian affair, has already drained off a large part of the available manpower. Furthermore, some of the nations that saw a responsibility to send troops to Suez might not construe such an obligation for Hungary. If a weak army were sent into Hungary and was shortly defeated, considerable pressure might be put on the larger Western allies to bail it out, and if they did so the East-West conflict would explode.

There are few safe alternatives for the West, and none offer the decisive feeling of satisfaction which sending an army to relieve the embattled Hungarians would give. But of the remaining choices, two are safe.

The U.N. powers, especially those of Western Europe, Asia and Africa, where Russia has been conducting her peace offensive, can and must convey their anger through diplomatic channels. The Communists must be brought to realize that they cannot win friendship while using force against freedom.

The U.N. can also adopt economic sanctions against the Soviet agressors and those allies who have supported them. Certainly it should not be argued that a severe curtailment of trade would wreck the Communist economy, for the East-West volume is not that large. But the Communist bloc still depends largely upon Western Europe for much of the heavy machinery it needs to expand and industrialize, and if this supply were cut off, it would effectively limit these possibilities for the Russians.

It must be emphasized that any approach must represent the civilized countries of the world, acting through the U.N., not just the United States, acting unilaterally. If economic sanctions were adopted, the U.S. would have to stand ready to absorb much of the trade that would otherwise go to Russia, or else risk economic collapse among our allies.

Only by demonstrating clearly and decisively that while the U.N. powers abhor the prospect of a Third World War, they will stop at nothing short of it to demonstrate their belief in self-determination and human dignity, can these countries impress upon the Russians their repulsion at Soviet invasions of Hungary.