Before Secretary of State Dulles' continental spin, the European Defense Community was struggling to frame a treaty that could pass its members' parliaments. Because of the weighty issues involved, this was a lingering process. Dulles demanded speed--or else, and then proudly noted that a treaty showdown was nearer. But he overlooked the fact that agreement was not. Under his urging, the Europeans might approve the treaty before they can settle their controversies, but this would only make later amendments more difficult.

Both amendment and ratification hinge on the settlement of one key issue. While Italy and the Benelux nations look on, France and Germany are fighting an epilogue to the Second World War. Haunted by visions of a new German militarism, the French demand a series of protocols which will assure them maintenance of a military upper hand. Heading France's list is the continuation of occupation rights, plus permission to withdraw French troops from the European army at any time, without losing Defense Community voting rights. Since the two nations are far from agreement on these points, and compromise is not likely in the near future, EDC is considering voting on the unfinished treaty.

By rushing settlement of this problem, Dulles has hampered efforts for both ratification and amendment. Proponents of the pact will have to sell a treaty still subject to changes. Even if there were no serious opposition to ratification of the treaty in European parliaments, American intervention would cause resentment. But with both the French and German Assemblies badly split on the bill, American warnings hand opposition parties a perfect theme song: Dollar Diplomacy. And even if the unfinished pact is ratified, future amendments will be that much harder. Knowing that they will get no second chance to junk the treaty, each member nation will hammer in its own proposals and insist that they stay. Development of a European army will drag until this bickering is terminated.

Instead of forcing a premature showdown, Dulles could help settle the vital dispute. France demands some safeguard from a future attack by Germany. Dulles could give them this protection by assuring the French of aid in the event of attack. This would hardly slur the Germans, who insist they will never attack anyway. As the Administration has linked America's fate with that of Europe, this French guarantee would entail no major change of policy. By taking this step Dulles could save EDC from months of internal wrangling and place European rearmament one step nearer completion.