The heaming master of ceremonies noisily rapped his fork against a water glass. Round the long luncheon table sat some of the leading lights in the Chicago business world. The meal had been good, quite good. Leisurely they chatted and un-wrapped expensive Havanas. The MC grew slightly irritated; they quieted. The speaker was introduced in extravagant terms; they applauded, extravagantly. As was usual, they only half listened to the after dinner speech. Half listened, until they heard the words: "...White was known to be a Communist spy by the very people who appointed him to the most sensitive and important position he ever hold." An angry buzz, the properly indignant grant, a happy I-told-you-so smile. As one executive calmly lit his cigar, Attorney General Herbert Brownell lit the fuse that set off partisan charge and countercharge across the nation.

Most observers think Brownell chose both the wrong place and the wrong words to open his accusations of laxity toward security risks by the Truman Administration. The same observers generally agree, however, that potentially dangerous laxity did exist.

At Harvard, as elsewhere, the controversial White case stirred considerable interest. Not since the last national election had Republicans and Democrats in the House dining halls and at the Faculty Club fired such loud broadsides of political argument and invective at each other. Under pressure of publicity and debate the White case broadened into the spies-in-government issue. Discussion then turned to the three evils: Communism, McCarthyism, and Original Sin.

In order to learn the considered views of seasoned observers, this reporter interviewed a half dozen politically-minded professors in the College and Law School. But before presenting their opinions some background highlights are necessary.

Charges of intrigue first made headlines in mid-summer 1948 when Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, self-confessed former underground agents, told the House Un-American Activities Committee about organized spying in government. Alger Hiss was high up on Chambers' prescription list and in time went to prison, convicted of perjury committed before an espionage-seeking committee.

'Red Herring'

Repercussions over the Chambers-Bentley testimony waxed hot. Politicians, spurred by patriotic fervor and desire for national notoriety, shouted of widespread Communist infiltration into key government policy posts. "Red herring!" countered President Truman and he dismissed the charges as cheap political attempts to discredit his Administration. But indications clearly pointed toward infiltration and systematic espionage, especially in the Executive Department.

In the wave of New Dealism that swept government in the early thirties some clandestine Communists were washed into new, hyper-liberal Federal agencies. Communism was not considered a menace per so in those days of a discouragingly sickly economy. It was quite fashionable in some circles to speak in shocking left-wing slogans. Dedicated New Dealers, earnest Fabians, and mildly argumentative Communists were often hard to distinguish.

According to the testimony of Chambers and Nathaniel Weyl, the first functional Red cell in Federal government came into being in 1933. Others followed. The secret work of cell-members was sometimes pure spying, sometimes subtle influence of policy by advancing careerists. Accused of being early cell members were Alger Hiss, Harold Ware, Victor Perlo, John Abt, Charles Kramer, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Henry Wadleigh '33, and Harry Dexter White. The last two, according to testimony, were not organizational Communists but were willing to play ball with the "apparatus." Other once-prominent government officials later accused of espionage activities were Harold Glasser, Nathan Silvermaster, V. Frank Coe and William L. Ullmann.

In 1939 Chambers told Adolf A. Berle, then Assistant Secretary of State in charge of security, about his cell and its operations. Berle circulated a confidential memo to high officials describing Chambers' charges; apparently it, received scant attention or belief since many of those named continued to rise in power.

A distraught Elizabeth Bentley in 1945 spilled her story of Communist spying to the FBI. She listed many whom Chambers and others had named earlier. Loud denials of William Remington, a Commerce Department employee, that he was a member of the Bentley group led to his perjury conviction on an allied charge of Communist membership.

One month ago Brownell initiated his headline-making disclosures of laxity which he addressed a luncheon conference of the Executive Club of Chicago saying, "White was known to be a Communist by the very people who appointed him to the most sensitive and important position he ever held."

McCarthy Jumps In

Private Citizen Harry S. Truman's first reaction was: "I don't recall that such a thing happened. As soon as we found out that White was wrong, we fired him." When records showed White resigned (fifteen months after he took office), was not fired, Truman observed: "People are sometimes fired by being allowed to resign."

President Dwight D. Eisenhower quickly asserted that no one questioned the loyalty of the former President. Brownell hastily agreed with the Chief Executive. Congressman Harold Velde rushed to subpoena Truman but he tripped over his Committee's by-laws and popular resentment. Senator Joseph McCarthy tried to make himself to focal issue in the 1954 election but Eisenhower said he hoped the whole spies-in-government excitement would be a matter of history by the next election and that the GOP would run on its legislative program. Many claimed the President couldn't control his own lieutenants; other praised his political acumen in staying above the mudslinging.