Collective security is now the axiom on which American foreign policy is based. Yet, despite the many advantages of merging scientific research, the United States still maintains a policy of atomic isolation. Co-operation between free world countries would clearly raise the level of Western research. Canada could give us vital information on nuclear piles, while the scientists of England and Australia, given access to America's modern research equipment could complement the work done here. Moreover, the money these nations are spending to repeat what America has done years ago, could be used to advance not duplicate, atomic research.

Many fear that information given to our allies would leak straight to Russia. Although a security system would be harder to manage in widely separated regions, still a basis for one already exists. Canada and Australia already have systems comparable to America's, while England, not far behind, is willing to tighten up. On the other hand, countries like France and Italy, endowed with a Communist menace, would have no place in such a merger.

In the field of non-secret information, United States policy is equally hostile to cooperation. Here, the McCarran Act, not security is the issue. Under its clearance system, obtaining visas is a one month process even for the most innocuous. But scientists, automatically viewed as potential spics, face delays of two or three months. Many turn down invitations altogether, to escape the tedious, often embarrassing, red tape.

It was just this insistence on conformity that immigrant scientists like Einstein and Fermi, men largely responsible for building the atomic bomb, came here to escape. In alienating foreign scientists, then, America may lose this fertile source of scientific excellence. Moreover, as scholars find greater respect in Europe than here, this policy is politically unsound.

Given the power, the Atomic Energy Commission could speed up visa permissions and make the process far less painful. If during his stay, a scientist could have access to secret information, a full security check is, of course, necessary. But if the conference is only concerned with unclassified material, as they usually are, the Commission could safely issue temporary visas for the duration of the meeting.

The present U.S. attitude toward atomic secrecy is based on a belief that the results of research can be locked up indefinitely. But the price of this secrecy will be a further stagnation of research. And with Russia steadily shortening our two year lead in the atomic race, ground lost now may never be regained.