To the Editors of the CRIMSON:
Your editorial on Stevenson was well-reasoned and highly convincing, but your treatment of Eisenhower seemed to contradict the opening distinction you made between present-day "hardened" Liberalism and careful independence of mind. To one who still has what he feels to be the best of reasons in favoring the General, you seemed guilty of one intellectual sin you deplored, "the Big Oversimplification." To cite at least three instances of this: (1) "On foreign affairs, where he is meant to be an expert, all Eisenhower has offered is a restatement of Democratic policy on Europe, in terms just different enough to cause havoc abroad." It would appear that "containment," "negotiation," and "liberation" alike have suffered from the misdefinition which one-word characterizations invite. Nevertheless, there is an emphasis in the foreign policy advocated by General Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles which bears recognition. There seems a legitimate marginal area short of war or operations of a risky quasi-military nature in which we may still hope to seize the diplomatic initiative. And the meaning of this becomes apparent if one subscribes to the view that even 'consolidation of the present Communist holdings, barring further expansion, precludes the possibility of a viable co-existence. . .
Ike's Foreign Policy
In this connection, the months following our presidential election may well mean success or failure for a strongly constituted Atlantic Community. Decisions of vital concern to Britain and Western Europe have been postponed until we select a new leader, and it will be important for him to be able to exercise immediate judgment based on personal familiarity with the problems in this sphere. Eisenhower's qualification of a year's experience as commander in SHAPE gives him a pre-eminent advantage here. (2) "Theirs (the GOP) is a policy of opposition at any cost, and although if in power they would change little, they have adopted the most negative sort of conservatism." The General's Baltimore speech of September 26th indicated the way in which he would change much in operating for Security with Solvency by attacking the large segment of our National Budget with a first-hand knowledge of the weapons' picture, the nature of inter-service rivalries and the conditions which lead to wastage in procurement. . .
(3) "For want of a political adult, then, the Republican Crusade has been compromised, reduced to utter sterility." Here there seems tendency on your part to mistake the noise of the Republican campaign for the General's true position. And since you are careful to separate both Truman and Stevenson's less worthy utterances from the latter's capacity for independent leadership, the following points seem worth making:
Reconciliation
(a) The post-convention situation saw Eisenhower with no clear mandate as Stevenson enjoyed. Despite the refreshing surge of political amateurism which ultimately gave him the nomination, he faced a real job of reconciling an embittered Old Guard in order to get out a vote which Dewey lost in 1948. Different situations confronted the candidates, and neither planned a campaign he expected to lose. (Not even Stevenson!)
(b) Still, "glowing support for the re-election of men like McCarthy" is hardly a fair estimate of the General's chosen way of achieving necessary unity. His statements have been disappointing in their lack of outright condemnation, but he has not compromised with regard to the methods of Jenner or McCarthy.
(c) His willingness to give blanket backing to the candidates which Republicans (and not a few Democrats) have nominated has a complementary attitude of determination the the GOP "Irresponsibles" can be more effectively disciplined within the competence of elected party leadership than without. . . . John R. H. Blum, 2G
