Workers usually strike against management to force the acceptance of their demands. The current coal strike does not fit this definition; it is against the Wage Stabilization Board, and successful or not, it is unreasonable.

The Board approved only $1.50 of the $1.90 daily wage increase agreed upon by the Union and the mine operators. This $1.50 is not an arbitrary figure, nor is it a compromise; it is the maximum increase that a group empowered to set maximum wages think safe for the country's economy.

The figure breaks down into two sums. The first, $1.05, automatically compensates for the rising cost of living, without need of the Board's approval. The second, $.45 cents, is the maximum salary increase the Board considers just in relation to the wage indexes of other heavy industries.

If the Board, having set the maximum wage on the basis of carefully established calculations, gives the miners more than they deserve, it sets a dangerous inflationary precedent. Should the coal miners receive more than they are entitled to, the way is clear for excessive demands by other workers. The UMW's strike can only succeed if it forces the Board to scrap the principle of stabilization on a rational basis.

The Board can, however, satisfy the Union's demands without causing a flood of overblown demands, Lewis' main argument for the increase is the disparity between the UMW's fringe benefits and those of other workers in heavy industry. If the miners will accept the 40 cents difference in the form of increased vacation pay, the strike can come to an early and honorable end.

Since the increase would bring the coal miners' benefits up to the national standard, the Board would be almost certain to approve it. Raising the vacation benefits to the nation would not establish an inflationary precedent; it would give the miners most of what they want, but cannot have as a pay boost.