Peace between Russia and the United States can only be achieved by a revolt of the Russian masses against their leaders. this is the theme of Dallin's latest books on the U.S.S.R.

Actually, despite its title, "The New Soviet Empire" deals very little with the specifics of Russia's post-war territorial acquisitions. One chapter deals with Soviet looting of conquered countries, but by and large this book confines itself to Russia's internal problems.

Dallin argues that Communist strength at home and abroad is based primarily on a "bandwagon effect" created by belief in Communist invincibility, and not on the desire of impoverished peoples to improve their lot. Hence he believes that the United States should concentrate, not on Point Four programs and the like, but on causing the Soviet to lose face--thus destroying the myth of Russian invincibility.

Dallin fails, however, to show how the United States can achieve this result short of all-out war. And presumably he does not endorse all-out war, despite his belief that Soviet leaders expect war with the U.S., since he feels that Russia cannot be conquered by outsiders.

Abandoning his attempt to find an effective policy for the anti-Communist nations, Dallin finds hope in the expectation that the Russian people will eventually throw off their Communist masters. He bases this conclusion on reports of popular dissatisfaction with the regime brought out from behind the Iron Curtain by former Communists who have become disillusioned with Stalin's rule. Unfortunately, such former communists are not the most objective reporters of popular opinion, though few others are available.

Thus the reports Dallin presents of black marketeers diverting from legal channels vast quantities of supplies, and hence undercutting Communist control of the planned economy, do not jibe with reports which Dallin concedes to be true of rapidly expanding officially-controlled production. Russia, to be sure, presents the same "seller's market" conditions that prevailed in the United States during war, but these conditions did not undermine the United States economy, and it is difficult to conceive of their undermining Russia's especially in view of the tighter controls and much sterner repressive measures available to the Russians.

Basing his conclusions on these sources, Dallin says that a new generation is coming into power which is loyal to the Russian nation but dissatisfied with the progress its leaders have made, and with their perversion of the ideals of the Revolution. He looks to this generation to overthrow the power of the current hierarchy.

After this overthrow occurs, Dallin feels we should not weaken Russia too much, since he thinks that it will be needed to balance the power of an inevitably restored Germany. In the meantime, he feels that we should attack the Communist leaders, but not the Russia people, in an effort is hasten the split between the two groups.

Dallin's book contains a multitude of valuable facts about, and insights into, current Soviet life and policies. Whether these facts and insights lead to the inferences Dallin draws as to a future revolution against the Stalin regime is another questio