Iran's Mohammed Mossadegh may soon find himself taking a side in a tumbril, according to C. Crane Brinton '19, McLean Professor of Ancient and Modern History.

"Nationalist Mossadegh is in the unhappy position of most revolutionary moderates, who, once having started a revolution, find they become victims of it," says Brinton, author of the "Anatomy of Revolution."

Likeliest executioner of the Iranian leader will be the communist Tudeh party, Brinton predicts. "Things have started snowballing in that direction, and every day brings bigger and better demonstrations for or against the regime. When the revenue which the administration got from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company dries up, there won't be pay for supporters, and the disorders will get even worse."

Russia will not necessarily be able to cash in if the local Communists get control, he adds. The Tudeh party may turn out to be Titoist, and that may mean the West will still get oil. Mossadegh and all his confederate landowners will be classed as kulaks, though, and suffer accordingly.

One way the Iranian premier can wriggle out is to capitulate to the old guard, as so many former revolutionaries have done, Brinton notes. As far as Iran's revolution is concerned, this means capitulating to the West, or specifically, to British oil interests.

Brinton is sure Mossadegh will hate to do this. "He is an intellectual, "and if he gives up now, he will feel he has not acted according to conscience." Worse, the Middle-Eastern effendi or upper class, of which he is a member, has built up a tremendous reservoir of inferiority feelings towards the West.

"Their 'pooled self-esteem' as one might call it, will certainly revolt at any further submission to the European. They would love to be rid of him. But the great question is, can they, and still keep their power?"

Less of Oil Revenues Unimportant

Anti-European isolationism is a possible way out, Brinton believes; "History shows the Japanese doing just this from 1611 to 1833, and the Chinese the same thing for over two centuries. If they cannot run Abadan's refineries themselves, therefore, the Iranians may very well let it go to rust."

Brinton suggests that the ensuing losses of all revenues may well mean no more to Iran's economy than tower ears and luxuries for the wealthy. "The benefits from these revenues have net gone down the class scale, and the masses' standards will be little affected in their absence."

Great skill will be needed if the Iranians are to tread this isolationist path, and Mossadegh, Brinton thinks, is not the man to do the treading--his head is likely to roll long before.

A final possibility is for extremist effendi reactionaries to oust Mossadegh by some coup. "If the effendi can do this." Brinton says, "They will almost certainly re-establish good relations with the West, realizing this is probably the only way they will be able to gain a sure lease on life for themselves."