A book with a triple title and a double authorship is bound to be somewhat disconnected. "The General and the President and the Future of American Foreign Policy" is disjointed to a certain extent, but all things considered, authors Schlesinger and Rovere have done a competent and interesting historic-reporting job on the great schism between General MacArthur and President Truman.

As the introductory not points out, "the President of the United States, although he figures prominently in the title of this work, does not figure very prominently in the work itself." The authors cite the constitutional reasons why this should be so but they are careful not to underestimate the influence of Mr. Truman's own opinions, as distinct from those of his advisers, in the development of the MacArthur controversy. They note that during the past six years there have been four Secretaries of State and three Secretaries of Defense, and it must therefore be in the President that the continuity of our foreign policy is embodied.

Concerning the general and his background, Rovere and Schlesinger have considerably more to say. 175 of the 252 pages of the book proper (there are 70 pages of appended documents) are devoted to tracing Douglas MacArthur's career form his birthplace in a military camp in Arkansas to his latest residence in a tower suite at the Waldorf Astoria. The technique of the narrative is to set the reader up with several pages of straight reporting, then siam him with a few paragraphs of interpretation. The tone is not so unfriendly to MacArthur as some of his other critical have been, but the authors have nearly undercut any claims the general may make to consistency, and have beaten down many of his most pronounced opinions with the bludgeon of hindsight.

Friends and admirers of the flamboyant MacArthur have been prompt--even eager--to point out minor factual inaccuracies in the present work, and thus to infer that the whole book is a shoddy job. Tbis will just not do; there is too much well-documented and relevant material that could only be refuted by a detailed counter-analysis of the general's motives and actions.

As for the future of American foreign policy, Reovere and Schlesinger reject MacArthur's view (which they style "unilateralism") in favor of the much-abused Kennan-Bohlen-State Department policy of "containment." The cause for containment sounds quite palatable after 175 pages of the general's ideas, and while this book will not convince any confirmed unilateralists, it makes good reading for those with opinions on the other side.