At midnight Tuesday the latest Congressional battle over President Truman's plans to reorganize parts of the executive branch of the Federal Government came to an end. Then, by law, 16 of the 21 proposals the president submitted in March went into effect, since Congress had not vetoed them by the prescribed time. But before that hour, the Senate had discussed 11 plans, voted down five in succession.

Truman's proposals were largely based on recommendations of the Hoover Commission, a non-partisan body established in 1947 to work out ways of simplifying the government's bureaucracy. The Commission reported in 1948, and last year the president sent his first seven plans to Capitol Hill where six passed. Under a regulation, the President is empowered to make changes in his branch of government so long as neither house of Congress disapproves of his plans before a set date--this time May 23. This rule was intended by Congress as self-defense against interest-group pressure--pressure more likely to affect actions of representatives than those of the chief executive.

Surrounded by a hale of non-partisan backing, possible economy in executive expenditures, and progress, most of the plans seemed certain of passage. In fact, Congress took no action until May 10. Then Senator Taft attacked the most vulnerable of the proposals, No. 12, which would have abolished the office of General Counsel in the National Labor Relations Board. The Hoover Commission never made this specific recommendation and, since the Office was established by the Taft-Hartley Act, both the Republican and Southern Democrat supporters of that bill opposed such an action. The Citizens Committee for the Hoover Reports--a non-partisan group behind the reform measures--did not favor the plan either. And debate on the bill took place while Majority Leader Lucas was desperately trying to force a vote on the Administration's F.E.P.C. measure, angering many members of his own party. Taft won on Plan 12, after accusing Truman of trying to nullify an act of Congress (Taft-Hartley) under the guise of reform.

On the same day, the Senate also killed the President's Treasury plan, which would have further centralized that department's administration under its secretary. Both a banker's association and Secretary Snyder opposed the plan, and even Lucas and Floor Leader Myers voted against it.

Within the next week, the Senate killed reorganization of the Interstate Commerce Commission, The Federal Communications Commission, and The Agriculture Department. On the last bill there was no debate--not one Senator arose to defend it. The opposition argument on these plans was that Truman was placing too much power in the hands of Department heads whom he appoints, and that the President did not strictly follow the Hoover Reports in his recommendations.

At the start of the Capitol struggle, the Citizens Committee still seemed confident of favorable Congressional action on all but the N.L.R.B. plan. After two plans were defeated, a Senator asked Hoover, one of the Committee's more prominent members, to speak; Hoover remained silent. The Committee's heads finally began to campaign, when they realized that those opposed to executive reform--many large pressure groups and their Congressional friends for whom bureaucratic confusion begets success--were winning. Of course, some Senators, sincerely opposed any more centralization of executive authority.

As telegrams and calls from home districts began to come in, the Senate upheld Plan No. 21, to abolish the Maritime Commission and distribute its functions to other departments. On Monday, Taft stated that he opposed further arbitrary killing of the proposals. By Tuesday the Upper House had passed six plans in a row, including some with the very reforms it had voted against before. The other ten went into effect without Congressional action.

Sixty-five percent of the Hoover Commission's proposals are still to be considered; Truman sent another batch of four to the Hill this month. And the 65 percent includes really controversial ones. Those favoring reform can only hope that the President holds close to the Commission's blueprints so that each measure can be debated on its own merits, not on partisan grounds. And, more important perhaps, so that Congress doesn't let the Capitol's balcony quarterbacks--the lobbies--call any more signals on its vital plays.