The injection of more than 30,000 Chinese Communist troops into North Korean fighting has presented the Western nations with a grave question: how far should the Unites States and the United Nations risk general war with China in pressing the fight against Communist aggression in Asia? To answer with any degree of certainty, they first had to know just what Mao Tse-tung's real objectives were.

Mao's foreign policy has been a bafiling one ever since he drove the Nationalists from the mainland, a little over a year ago. At first, the Peiping government courted the recognition of other nations, but when Britain complied (the most important non-Communist power to do so) Mao rebuffed her. Communist China asked admission to the U. N., but as soon as the United States began the look favorably upon the proposal, Peiping provoked the Angus ward incident.

In India, Mao seemingly had acquired a valuable Asian friend. But three weeks age Chinese troops bowled through Tibet--buffer between Communist China and non-Communist India--despite strong protest from New Delhi that "invasion of Tibet by Chinese troops cannot but be regarded as deplorable...recent developments have affected (Indo-Chinese) friendly relations."

Hostility

Only one clear line emerges in China's foreign policy unfriendliness to wards the West (including discouragement of trade) as opposed to at least surface cordiality with Russia.

The U. S. and U. N. are now face to face with Communist China over several issues where they must attempt to tread the narrow path between vigorous policy and war.

In Korea, the original decision to send in U. N. troops involved the gamble that Mao would not interface. As late as the mid-September Inchon landing relatively small Chinese reinforcements might have pushed MacArthur's troops into the sea. Peiping waited until U. N. forces approached the important Yalu River power dams and then committed a full two divisions.

Many of MacArthur's advance units were cut off and trapped; the main line was hastily drawn back and consolidated. Two hundred and eighty thousand U. N. troops are now tied down in the cautions push northward as winter sets in.

Peiping Delegation

The U. N. Security Council has temporarily shelved the Formosa question and that of a Peiping seat in the U. N., and is awaiting a Peiping delegation to discuss possible settling of differences and withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea. At present no one is sure of Mao's real aims in entering the fight. "Perhaps what the Chinese really fear," Secretary of State Acheson said Wednesday, "is the loss of their interest in the northern border area-notably the Yalu River power installations. If so, the U. S. will do everything possible to make certain they know their interests will be protected."

Even if successful negotiations are possible, they will undoubtedly be drawn-out. At best, all available U. N. troops will be tied down in Korea for months to come, further impeding Western European defense plans.

The United States also faces China indirectly through French Indo-China. America sends roughly the same amount of money to France each year under the Marshall Plan as the French are spending to maintain their 150,000-man army in Indo-China (roughly the same number as the U. S. has in Korea.)

At present, China is actively supporting the Viet Minh rebel forces with men and weapons, so that the French are waging a losing war to maintain the unpopular Bao Dai regime.

If the United States does not give a great deal of more active support to Indo-China, the country will probably eventually fall into Communist hands. If America does send troops and equipment, active Chinese intervention may again greet us, this time supported by a hostile native population.