(Articles in this department represent the opinions of these editors who differ with the expressed editorial policy of the CRIMSON).

Doubtless there is some danger involved in the decision to send American and South Korean forces across the 38th parallel at this time. It will certainly reinforce the Communist propaganda line in Asia where the propaganda charges American or white imperialism. It may provoke the Peking government of China, or perhaps the Kremlin, into some new aggressive action, even into an all-out war. But in the present situation the risks involved in immediately occupying all of Korea appear to be sound.

If we had waited for action by the United Nations, we would have faced the possibility of a prolonged filibuster in the General Assembly or an outright veto in the Security Council. The Soviet delegation has often shown its readiness to use both of these tacties; it is doing so right now. Furthermore, recognition of the difficulty in obtaining the General Assembly's required two-thirds majority has prompted the British to introduce an enabling resolution so ambiguous, and at the same time so mild, that it actually would provide little further justification for MacArthur than the resolutions of the 25th and 27th of June. Thus even the doubtful probability of securing swift action from the U.N. would not overcome the threat of anti-U.S. propaganda.

In the meantime, were the U.N. forces to withdraw behind the 38th parallel, the world would begin to doubt America's determination to meet its obligations. We would be in the same foolish position politically and militarily as before the 25th of June.

If the American and U.N. action in Korea is to have any meaning beyond that of saving half of a remote country from an aggressor, it must be shown to the world that the United States, as democracy's strongest defender, is prepared to go the limit to guard world freedom. That was the significance of the Berlin airlift, that was the significance of aid to Greece and Western Europe, and that must be the significance of the establishment of a free and united Korea, undisturbed by imaginary partitions.

The action of the Eighth Army means that the North Koreans will probably have no opportunity to reorganize their forces; if, as seems doubtful, they are considering surrender, the North Koreans will be more likely to respond to force than kindness. And as to the question of propaganda in Asia, so long as central governments control all means of communication (as they do in China and Russia) any of our actions will be turned against us in the official pronouncements. But as long as the United States keeps its hands free from "capitalist-imperialist" intentions, it need not be ashamed of its policy in the eyes of the free world, and it need not fear the vetoes, filibusters, and propaganda of the unfree.