In peacetime the United States seldom exerts the full weight of its influence in world politics. Even after the results of the first World War put it indisputably in the ranks of the great powers, it declined to enter the League of Nations, passed the Neutrality Act, and postponed even mild restraining measures against the late, unlamented Axis until it was bludgeoned into action. In the two years since the United States emerged from World War II as one of the super-powers, its foreign policy has often seemed to operate on a day to day, catch-as-catch-can basis.

It is easy to underestimate the effects of American foreign policy since it is aimed primarily at securing the peace and can therefore show for its efforts only intangible results. But, taking this fact into consideration, the proposals of the Secretary of State, made in his speech at Harvard's Commencement, presage a foreign policy different in degree if not in kind from the old hit or miss variety.

What has since become known as the "Marshall Plan" would substitute for the piecemeal rehabilitation of Europe a gigantic international planned economy. The plan has two great advantages even from the most narrow, selfish point of view. It would bring into play in the battle for peace America's most powerful weapons--dollars and productive might; and it offers tremendous gains with negligible risk.

As long as the State Department is faced by a dearth of facts which make it impossible to calculate Russia's intentions, it's action is restricted by the fear of betting its entire roll on the wrong horse. But under the Marshall Plan it could go ahead without the necessity of making a choice, based at best on guesswork. If Russia is really headed towards unlimited expansion, the United States will gain friends in western Europe, relieve the economic pressure which has forced several nations to a state of dependence on the whims of Moscow, and drive a sizable wedge into the Russian bloe. If Russia is motivated chiefly by a desire for security and is sincerely interested in building an order in Europe wherein there is safety for other nations as well, the action of the United States would be a good will gesture of unprecedented proportions; it would make "dollar diplomacy" a term of respect rather than one of derogation, and would help Europeans to see Americans as Americans see themselves.

Yet the plan contains its own private nightmare. Should the European nations go ahead in their activities as outlined by the Secretary of State, should they place all their eggs in the Marshall basket, present their proposals to the United States, and should Congress then fail to back up the State Department with funds, the plan would be turned into a gigantic boomerang. The stock of the United States would sink to an as yet unplumbed depth. And this is by no means an inconceivable possibility, for the appropriations involved will be staggering. They will dwarf the two and a quarter billions spent on UNRRA. The Second Session of the Eightieth Congress may be more than somewhat reluctant to dig so deeply into the nation's pocket at a time when it will be mainly preoccupied with jockeying for position in the All America Sweepstakes of November, 1948.