Its portent emphasized by stern and conservative language, "One World Or None" jolts into sharp focus the problem created by the release of atomic energy. The 79-page report leaves no question as to the gravity of the problem and the need for decisive and immediate action toward its solution. And the authors--Walter Lippmann, General Arnold, and thirteen top-ranking scientists--conclude that the only way to this solution lies in a sovereign world organization designed to eradicate both the right and the possibility of waging war.

The early chapters from the foundation for such a conclusion by showing the problem itself in its scientific and military aspects. The cornerstone is laid by Philip Morrison (official War Department investigator of the results of the Hiroshima bomb) whose picture of the effects of a single bomb on New York City should convince skeptics that the atomic bomb would be nearly as unpleasant for concrete-housed Americans as it was for bamboo-sheltered Japanese. He stresses that the only inaccuracy in his description, which includes 300,000 killed and a host of wounded that would tax hospitals as far as St. Louis, is that the bombs will "never again come in ones or twos."

Morrison's picture may not disturb the "just another weapon" school of thought which relaxes securely in its belief that defenses will fix everything. But Louis N. Ridenour shows the impotency of anything under one hundred percent defense, and the physical impossibility of anything over ninety percent defense. It is the huge destructive power of the bomb that makes even ten percent efficiency economical from an attacker's viewpoint. For, per square mile destroyed, an atomic bomb of the Hiroshima class is six times cheaper than other explosives, according to General Arnold, and possibly up to one hundred times cheaper, according to J. R. Oppenheimer.

Negative defenses such as decentralizing industry and moving cities underground are deemed unlikely during peace and too late in case of war. Nor is there a possibility of defense by keeping the bomb secret. Not only do Hans Bethe and Frederick Seitz estimate that other nations will have an atomic bomb within six years, but they believe that Russia may well be ahead of us by the end of this period.

Taking off from Harold C. Urey's statement that "it adds up to the most dangerous situation humanity has ever faced in all history," the second part of the book discusses solutions. Dismissing international control of atomic energy as a cure-all, although recognizing its importance in any plan, Leo Szilard sees in world government the only complete security. Neither Albert Einstein's nor Walter Lippmann's chapter succeeds in more than indicating a satisfactory plan for such an organization. But Einstein shows clearly the functions the organization must undertake, while Lippmann sets forth original and cogent evidence that the world is ready to relinquish the concept of national sovereignty. The whole report asserts with great force of logic, if without trimmings of eloquence, that we are either ready to give up national sovereignty, or we are ready for destruction.