With Trieste, the Danube, and a Sarajevo-like delicatessen shooting temporarily disposed of, attention can be riveted upon United Nations progress with the disarmament problem. Russia made an important concession last week in agreeing to international inspection of world disarmament, including the abolition of atomic weapons. But her insistence upon keeping the veto power in disarmament questions has drawn a storm of criticism not only to the Soviet proposal but to the motives behind it as well. Some of the criticisms are thoughtful; others contain an air of cynicism that add little to the discussion.

Walter Lippmann represents a school of thought that sees something sinister in the Soviet willingness to disarm. Stating that Russian military strength depends upon its manpower while ours rests on a technological base, he says that the Soviet proposal "is in its essence that the Soviet Union should demobilize and that we should disarm." In other words, Russia would lose nothing by sending the troops home, while we would render ineffectual our science-dependent war machine. The first of two important points over looked by this Machiavellian school is that the USSR economy is today suffering from an acute shortage of farm and industrial manpower. Her eagerness to demobilize is based upon hard-headed, urgent, home need. Because Russia is not naively confident of peace, her disarmament plans can hardly be attributed to a clever scheme for gaining arms supremacy. The second point is that Russia used generous amounts of mechanized equipment in the late struggle and is experimenting with atomic weapons today. It seems extremely unlikely that she will let outsiders convince her that huge masses of men are her finest weapon. Criticism of Soviet motives for disarmament are particularly futile at this time.

But more important is the continued indignation over Russia insistence upon keeping the veto power. Security Council control of disarmament with the veto intact has been stated to be "not good enough for the United Kingdom" and presumably is not good enough for the United States either. Without becoming entangled in the legalistic niceties of the veto question, it would seem that Russia's refusal to budge on this point does not stem from some dangerous plan of aggression but rather from her desire to maintain her sovereignty or nationalistic identity for want of a better policy. Similarly, the United States has shown no readiness to submit her control of Pacific bases or the Panama Canal to international control without a veto. And Great Britain would be offended if it was suggested that the UN have final say over her sea and oil bases in the Middle East.

This is not to state or imply that the USSR is right and just in the veto question and we are wrong. Rather it is to suggest that as long as national sovereignty remains the world's key frame of reference there will be two good sides to every major problem. Russia will be insistent upon preserving what she considers essential to her national welfare. But her policy, like ours, is not static. As her about-face on the inspection issue proves, the Soviet will change her policy as her nationalistic needs change. The only conclusion, general though it may be, is that more attention should be paid to Big Three agreements and less to disagreements. The little cracks that appear from time to time in the wall of national sovereignty should be exploited, not belittled.