The President has made the nation's coal miners government employees, and has told them that subsequently they cannot strike. Should all negotiations with the United Mine Workers fail, Roosevelt will have this government employee status to use as a club. But the usually good diplomat, showing signs of desperation in his losing fight with John L. Lewis, blundered when he told the miners that they cannot strike. Earlier he had acted wisely, appealing to the diggers not to strike as a patriotic duty. But by raising the legal question the President has encouraged the breeding of hostile attitudes. His statement is not consistent with the realities of industrial relations. The miners, accustomed to the freedom of action which years of union activity have given them, do not understand the word "cannot." If John L. Lewis shakes his head, even government-employed miners can refuse to show up at the shafts.

This problem of Government relations with unions goes far beyond the exigencies of the present labor crisis. In the immediate future, the government will be the consumer of more than half of the output of the durable goods industries of the country. The government as a customer is not, fettered by the constitutional limitations of which it is subject as a government. It will be next to impossible for business and organized labor to prevent their largest customer from imposing almost any policy it desires.

Although it has been argued that the government is sovereign and cannot set up any body on a par with itself, the fact remains that governmental units are faced with important problems of human and industrial relations. Grievances and mismanagement will crop up. The question arises: "What is the function of a union in this situation," and the answer is important both for the present emergency in the mines and future problems in government operated and controlled enterprises.

Except for several exceptions, such as the TVA where the government management enters into annual agreements with its employees, the salary scales of government employees are unilaterally determined and rigid. As a result, a union in government must become a political pressure group to get higher wages through Congressional lobbying. This is not realistic; direct negotiations would result in much closer analysis of the case. The answer is to follow the lead of the British.

In Britain the Parliament votes an appropriation for an agency and then allows the ministry to operate on that amount as best they can. If the union of the employees in that agency disputes with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the government is bound to arbitrate and to accept the decision, obtaining further appropriations from Parliament when necessary. British municipalities have gone even further, dealing with civil service employees like any private enterprise.

The mine strike and the President's legalistic "cannot strike" proclamation have brought this problem of government-union relations to the surface. Our post-war planning should include a reappraisal of the problem in the light of the British experience.