The problem of what to do with Germany after the war is one of the most difficult questions of the future. How can she best be treated so as to be the least menace to her neighbors and the world in the years to come?

To clear the way for a brief discussion of a few points below, it is necessary to make certain assumptions with which the reader may or may not agree, but which cannot for lack of space be argued here. These assumptions, which correspond with the writer's own convictions, are:

That the Nazi armies will be beaten, probably disintegrate of be driven back onto German soil, and forced to unconditional surrender or its equivalent;

Cooling-Off

That the cessation of hostilities will be followed, not by an early peace treaty, but by an "armistice period," a "reconstruction" or "recuperation" period of perhaps two or three years.

That no post-war settlement for Europe will be satisfactory in the long run unless it includes a satisfactory settlement for Germany -- unless it holds out to the German people the prospect of eventual participation on substantially equal terms (as was not the case after 1919) in the political and economic life of the new world order. Fortunately, in respect to economic opportunity this prospect is held out to Germany in Point Four of the Atlantic Charter: ". . . . the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;"

Occupation

That during the armistice or reconstruction period there will be a United Nations military occupation of Germany. In this occupation of Germany it is realistic to suppose that the two greatest air and sea powers, Great Britain and the United States, would have the predominant role.

Will the Bolshevist armies occupy at least a part of Germany before the Western Allies get to Berlin? Will they not want to set up a Communist regime in Germany? Possibly Stalin might occupy East Prussia as a token of victory and a pledge in hand that Germany would fulfill the armistice conditions to be imposed upon her. But, all things considered, it does not seem likely that Stalin will want to Bolshevize Germany or take an exclusive or even leading part in ruling her in the post-war period.

The whole trend of this policy for a dozen years has been more and more away from the Trotsky policy of "world revolution" and the spreading of Communism throughout the globe. In his great statesmanlike speech of November 6, 1942, he said, "It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia, but the Hitlerite State can and should be destroyed."

He has repeatedly stated, and we believe with all sincerity, that his main war aim is to free "Russian soil" from the Nazi armies, meaning that he intends to keep only those regions which used to be part of old Tsarist Russia: the Baltic Provinces of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania which in 1940 voted almost unanimously (under pressure) for incorporation into the Soviet the eastern half of pre-war Poland, occupied by Russian in 1939 and inhabited largely not by Poles but by White Russians and Lithuanians; the Ukraine; Bessarabia; and bits of Bukovina and Moldavia. If, in addition to gaining these wide territories for protection against Germany, he is convinced that the Western Allies will take effective measures to prevent a future German menace to Russia, it is more than likely that Stalin will be satisfied to let them undertaker the task. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the other United Nations should come to an understanding as soon as possible with Russia as to the establishment of some plan of "security" in Europe.

The Bolshevists are justly very proud of what they have accomplished in Russia during the past decade. Their pride of accomplishment has naturally been greatly increased by the prodigious achievements of their armies in comparison with the inability of the capitalist nations to open a second front on the continent of Europe.

So it is probable that Stalin, if convinced that he will not be seriously menaced by a post-war Germany, will prefer to turn his attention again to the upbuilding of Russia's proud internal economy and to repairing the ruins of war rather than to policing and controlling Germany. That is why it may be assumed that this unenviable task will fall predominantly to Great Britain and the United States.

Germany's Boundaries

The United Nations, at the cessation of hostilities if not earlier, should reassert and recognize the boundaries of the European states as of 1933, so far as possible (i.e. except for limitations mentioned below.) This reassertion of old boundaries would have the advantage that it would emphasize as an international principal that aggressive conquests by force and in defiance of treaty obligations, such as those made by the Axis Powers, will not be recognized.