There was no mincing of words in President Conant's testimony before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday. Once again the Harvard executive, undismayed by his august audience, laid his cards on the table. He believes that the Axis powers, which threaten "our way of life," must be beaten at all costs, even at the price of an American armed force to protect England and defeat Hitler. It was a reiteration of his stand last fall that the question of when to send troops to Europe is a matter of strategy, nothing more, nothing less.

And, as it did last fall, the Crimson must raise its voice in a protest against the sentiments and the ideas voiced by the University's chief. A new board of editors has succeeded the old--a board which wishes now to clarify its position on the policy to be adopted by our country toward the war in Europe.

We believe that the preservation of England should be a primary aim of the United States. The nation that is putting up so valiant a fight against the forces of aggression is, if only incidentally, serving as a bulwark of the unprepared western hemisphere against the common enemy. It is with a purely selfish aim in mind that this country must flood Britain with the aid which the defenders need so badly. Guns and planes and shells and ships must flow in a ceaseless stream from this hemisphere to the other. An arsenal we must be, not because we love the land of roast beef and brown ale, but because we fear for the land of hamburgers and Coca Cola. Up to this point we see eye to eye with Mr. Conant as to what is to be done. But here we part company, radically, and our parting reveals the difference in theory that underlies our separate concepts of "aid to England."

In his opinion we must follow up our material aid, if it does not suffice, with soldiers and sailors from this country to insure the defeat of Hitler and Hitlerism. We fell that we must set a limit on our aid lest it destroy its original purpose. Our aid policy is a means to the end of securing liberty over here; we must not let the means destroy the end. We must not permit ourselves to become militarily involved in the war. If American soldiers or sailors start to fight Britain's battle, our own battle will be lost. Unlike war in 1917, war in 1941 must be "total." Once American battleships fire or are fired upon in Europe waters, we shall be committed to a policy that will end years latter either with American doughboys marching down. Unter den Linden, or with a shameful and disastrous retreat to our own hemisphere. In any case this war will mean universal conscription, loss of civil liberties, regimentation, and hard times. It will means a loss of the principles and the very "way of life" for which we would professedly be fighting.

Whether we can set this limit between material aid and military intervention is the important question: We believe that it is possible. We believe that the overwhelming majority of the citizens of this country is in favor of setting such an absolute Limit and will set it, despite the efforts of some of the nation's most influential forces to convince them of a need for war. We believe that if the destroyers and the combat planes which we rush to Britain in the next two months are not enough, we must not tempt Mars by advancing to the fray ourselves. We must fall back on our defenses, which are improving with each new increase in production and each new perfection of technique.

If Britain stands, thanks to our ministrations, we will be in the ideal position of a democracy, friendly to the victor in the war and holding the balance of power. If Britain falls, we shall fall back from our first line of defense to our hemispheric line, which we shall mean-while have been fortifying. This course, like the other, carries with it its risks of loss of freedom and lowering of living standards, but in our eyes the risk is less. Friendship with South America, a small, efficient army, and an active navy will protect us. The chances of our becoming an armed camp under these conditions are less than they would be if we were a huge base for the conquest of Europe. This is the road which contains fewer pitfalls than any other, and it, more surely than any other, will lead us eventually to the long-range goal which we and Mr. Conant seek in common.