In my last column I discussed the irrationality of a beat Hitler policy which isn't based on a very definite prospectus of the means by which it is to be achieved. This week I want to consider the irrationality of a program adopted with no definite idea of its ultimate end. As far as I can see, we have made no effort to see this war as a world revolution, but are plunging along on the theory, "he hit me, so I hit him back." National discussion today revolves about the efficacy of our program from a completely starry-eyed point of view, failing to account for either the immediate strategical problem of the final world peace problem. This sort of thinking gives me the feeling that we're butting a blank wall, making our strength and resolution seem pathetic.

What's behind the present state of world conflict is a transformation in the process of production which necessarily demands a transformation in social conceptions. Up to the present demand for good has far exceeded productive capacity. Now the reverse is true. A comparatively small number of employees can supply world needs. The old-fashioned distributive mechanism has broken down. This has meant the most tremendous sort of dislocations in both domestic and international political and social relations. It has meant in home affairs that the socialist planning idea has grown to such an extent that New Dealism has realized many of its aims. In international affairs it is manifest in the breakdown of export-industrialism and free trade. Not only is this true in Germany where the ultimate solution was war for living room, but also in England where the Ottawa Agreements and the whole postwar tariff system signified a desperate resort to self-sufficiency.

This is not a terribly original notion. It is one that most of us will admit as obvious. A popular book, "The Managerial Revolution," has outlined its main phases. The whole nature of the world order at present indicates that in the future liberty must be guaranteed by some sort of central planning for the welfare of the people. Yet our thought on the German revolution places us in heroic defense of antiquated Wilsonian principles of national sovereignty, free trade, and individualistic capitalism.

The violence of the Nazi means has blinded us to the truth of some of their ends. Organization of Europe as an economic unit is one of the necessary steps to world planning. Centralization of industrial control likewise is required if excess productive capacity is to be adjusted to consumptive demand. These are ideas which will be incorporated in any peace. The point is that in breaking the shackles which restrained these ideas, the Nazis have generated new forces such as the superior race cult and ceaseless expansion doctrine. That these forces are wrong no one will deny, but that they are more wrong than the stupid devices of the World War I victors in their try at world management is questionable.

The solution to our errors we readily concede is peace and reason. We cannot set up new principles until we comprehend the facts of the new order. But when the crisis comes in the form of force, we desert reason and strike at froth; we ignore basic ends to oppose immoral means; we forestall any real solution to the end of a bitterly destructive war. I cannot see this policy as the assertion of what we hold most dear: faith in the intelligence of ourselves and our common man to work out a decent destiny through reason. Hence I would favor a negotiated peace in which were came to grips with the fundamental problems that are racking the world, in which we placed our strength behind rationalism rather than moral sentiment