Capitalizing on "our won geographic isolation from Europe" may well be the best way to safeguard American interests, during the present European war, according to Donald C. McKay, assistant professor of History, in an article prepared for the American Independence League today.

In a plea to "distinguish clearly between our individual emotions on one hand and the national interests of the American people on the other", McKay attacked interventionists for not having offered "an explicit and realistic program." His conclusions are printed in the Harvard Alumni bulletin which appears this morning.

This No idealistic War

"Historians at least will scarcely be convinced that this is a struggle between demons and angels." The professor refused to place the guilt wholly on one side, observing that the origins of the National Socialist regime "were not unconnected with French policy and British policy in the period following the war."

Intervention in Europe to prevent Hitler from directing his next blitzkrieg at the United States has a 'certain fascination for the man on the street," McKay attacked "this bogey of invasion" both from at technical and a political point of view and questioned whether "any one state will find itself sufficiently footloose to wage war in the Western hemisphere."

Past history "has pretty clearly shown that the growth of an overwhelmingly powerful state in Europe will not be tolerated." The authority on French history showed how such threats had "been parried by counter-coalitions", citing those against Napoleon, Russia, and Germany in recent times.

Russia Won't Lot Nazis Win

A rapprochement between Germany and Russia began as early as 1922, and for that reason the Pact of August 24 "was more of a surprise in some quarters than it should have been."

McKay doubted that this friendship was more than a marriage do convenance. If the two owers won the war together Russia would not relish a strong Germany on the west especially as the latter's claims to the Balkans and the Ukraine have never been repudiated.

"Are we asked to imagine that Hitler will renounce those designs on Russia . . . simply because he has defeated his enemies in the west and is now in a position to deal with Russia alone?" The historian felt "It seems in the highest degree unlikely that the Russians will over permit a victory of the Germans."

Baltic Grabs Favor Allies

Furthermore, according to McKay, territories which Russia has taken in the Baltic "are little connected with French or British interests: all envisage the eventual German menace." This move will prevent the small northern states from falling into Nazi control "and at the same time give Russia strategic harbors for possible future attacks on vital German wartime supplies coming down the Baltic sea."

Democracy A Feeble War Aim

Russia can play a waiting game, the professor believes, feeding supplies to both sides and hoping that the resulting exhaustion of both sides will pave the way for communism in Central Europe.

Are democratic institutions at stake? McKay points out that "both French and British democracy were revealing signs of weakening before the war began." And then, he asks, "will post-war exhaustion bring, even in victory, some new economic controls and some kind of authoritarian political regime?"

War regimentation in this country might definitely weaken "American democracy. "If Italy joins the Allies (as she might well do), what happens to a crusade for democracy which aims to destroy Nazi while at the same time it strengthens Fascist Italy?"

Finally McKay questions whether America could contribute to a just peace. She could scarcely lend her moral weight while "war aims of the Allies continue in their present obscurity."

What would he the U. S. stand on Poland, Czechoslovakia, on a possible French partition of Germany! "It is just this maddeningly insoluble character of these problems that convinces cynics that peace treaties mark not so much the end of one war as the vestibule to the next."

In conclusions the historian felt that rather than adopt a hard set program we should "develop a healthy attitude of scepticism." Americans are too often inclined, he felt, "to be romantic in their attitudes toward the old world."