The military coup d'etat by Nicaragua's "strong man", General Somoza, brings the problem of Latin American policy again into the foreground. With the Pan-American Congress scheduled for the near future, with $13,000,000 investments and a ninety-year option on the Nicaragua canal route at stake, the delicate problem of recognition becomes of paramount interest, particularly since under the Central American treaty of peace and amity of 1923 we are unable to recognize a ruler who comes to power by a coup d'etat.

The Roosevelt good-nabor policy represents the first enlightened approach to Latin American diplomacy in over two centuries. Under that policy, the United States has declined to intervene in internicine affairs and has respected the political autonomy of its Caribbean neighbors. Action by the State Department in the Chaco war and in the Machado fiasco was taken only after careful consultation with the leading powers of the southern hemisphere. The Rooseveltian repudiation of the Socony-United Fruit-Chase National policies of Hoover and Coolidge has won favor throughout Hispanic America. It has paved the way for the extremely lucrative reciprocal tariff agreements with Brazil and the Argentine. The latest expression of Latin approval of American policy came in the unanimity of agreement over the impending Pan-American Congress.

Therefore it would seem reasonable that the principles of the good nabor policy should be applied in solution of the Nicaragua affair. When and if the time arrives to determine whether or not to recognize the new Somoza government, Washington would do well to follow its 1933 precedent, and consult with the ABC powers prior to taking any definite action.