Even if the vision is imperfect, there is some public consciousness of what the President's voyage to South America, might mean. That hypothetical entity known as the man in the street would probably say that it was a further attempt to create a new balance in the New World to rectify the Old. Such glowing phraseology, however, does more to obscure than to instruct. What the New World is very much concerned about is its own inviolability. It might, indeed, be called a policy of enlightened selfishness. Certainly the great stake this nation has in keeping the Western Hemisphere free from violent eruptions must be clear to everyone.

The pathway for pacific relations among the American nations has been consistently smoothed during the past two administrations. Dollar diplomacy and a threatening "big stick" attitude on the part of the United States have been discarded as unprofitable, fortunately for both continents. The voyage to Buenos Aires, it may be hoped, will signalize the conquest of the last vestige of hate and distrust which South and Central American countries still harbor as the result of the traditional aggressiveness of their "big brother".

When, therefore, the nations assemble, the recent amicable relationship must be embodied in definite form. The first in this program should be a sincere effort to make a multi-lateral document of the Monroe Doctrine. Certainly our self-as-sumed responsibility as a querelous, often mistaken, and sometimes violently active "governor" of this hemisphere has proved more than we want and probably more than we can cope with today. It is true that a multi-lateral convention will involve a certain measure of limited, mutual responsibility. That, however, is to be expected, and any sign of the United States demanding something for nothing will be disasterous to any hopes the American peoples may entertain concerning peace and security.

The second important means of implementing American friendship is through trade agreements. Unquestionably, the scope of the present treaties can be almost indefinitely enlarged. It would, of course, be crass stupidity to overlook several obstacles in the path of adjustment, and certain concessions that the South American countries will have to make. Among these are the strong commercial ties existing between them and England and Japan, also, but to a lesser extent, Germany and France. On the political side, it would not do to forget the number of Latin American countries which have presidents in name but dictators in point of fact, who might well be sympathetically disposed towards similar, dictator-controlled nations. And, lastly, it would be inexcusable to neglect potent racial minorities in several of the South American countries, whose heritage might lead them to involve their nations with the European states most likely to become embroiled in war.

Mark Sullivan, beclouding the issue with more than his usual adeptness, contributes a piece of muddled thinking when he likens the Conference to the "Wilsonian illusion". The new effort is directed, indeed, towards a limited measure of international security, but nobody expects it to provide a patent remedy for world differences. Rather it is an opportunity for horse-trading, for the exchange of one practical concession for another. And if the seeds planted concern a multi-lateral agreement and trade pacts, Buenos Aires will not be found a Sahara.