Heralded as a reply to the innovations at the Yale Law School. Dean Pound's annual report fails to stress sufficiently the fundamental issue which challenges law schools all over the country, namely, whether or not the theory that judgment is a matter of purely legal logic, upon which most of our law training is based, has outlived its usefulness.

It is obvious that the case-system, which predominates at Harvard, is based on the presumption that legal decisions are made with reference to the letter of the law and that previous decisions should determine the conduct and disposal of all legal problems. As an expression of this type of thinking carried to the extreme we cite the famous remark of a Harvard professor to the student who mentioned Justice, "If you want Justice, go to the Divinity School." This statement is eloquent in its crass failure to meet the issue.

With the increasing belief in individual treatment of each problem, a belief admirably demonstrated, in criminal cases at least, by Professor Glueck's studies, a grave question is raised on the matter of methods in legal training. If a lawyer in presenting a case and a judge in passing judgment on it, must obey the monistic theory now so favorably regarded, it is doubtful whether the case-system and the methods which it implies, is a satisfactory medium of approach.

To be sure, Dean Pound appears to recognize the increasing demands for individualistic treatment, and his recommendation of a fourth year seems to be designed as a step in this direction. But what is not stressed, and what should be a moving factor in any changes that are made at the Law School, is that modern law is based not so much upon legal technicalities, as upon political, social, and economic considerations. The mere addition of courses in sociology, economics, and government to the curriculum would not meet the problem. It is a change in the basic method of approach--a change from a standardized to an individualized concept of each case--that must be adopted if the Harvard Law School is to retain its supremacy.

Nor does Dean Pound's report deal with the criticism that the Law School has become factory-like and sadistic. The degenerating influences of the grind necessary to meet the final examinations and the recently-adopted comprehensive examinations are left unmentioned in the report. Not too much can be expected in the way of reform if the remark, made by a professor in the Law School recently that the "dawn of intelligence commences with the grade of 67" is typical of the attitude of the faculty.

If Harvard continues to ignore the present trend toward a system of justice premised on sociological, political, and economic factors, and nourishes a type of teacher who considers Justice standardized, it is doomed, as all lawyers and legal systems which have failed to meet the requirements of society have been doomed. For the function of the lawyer--and above all the lawyer-teacher--is not only to teach what is the law and what its historical development has been, but also upon what the law as an expression of Justice is based. And in anticipation of our critics who may ask, as a famous judge once asked Carlyle, to define Justice, we quote Carlyle's reply: "My Lord, it is not up to me to define Justice; it is up to you to do it."