Strictest neutrality is the policy to which the United States is committed in the Ethiopian struggle. The Senate intended to insure this by the much-discussed neutrality legislation, and an overwhelming majority of the people obviously approve. Nevertheless, despite--or perhaps because of--their profound desire for peace, a majority equally overwhelming support Great Britain and the League in their effort to apply sanctions against Italy. It is the old American dilemma--the desire to interfere yet to remain uncutangled, to advise but not to execute.

Secretary Hull, in formulating American policy, has expressed the national temper most successfully. In a radio address, delivered in his name by the Undersecretary of State on Wednesday night, he explained that mere neutrality is not enough, that the United States has a duty to maintain peace, and that this duty should be fulfilled "by the use of our influence, short of becoming involved in the dispute itself." These words are innocuous enough in themselves, as were similar statements made early in the World War or at the time of the less-tragic but equally humiliating Manchurian crisis. They are merely vague, and lack of precision in foreign policy is always dangerous.

What, exactly, is "our influence, short of becoming involved in the dispute itself"? It is great, but only because we might become involved. The League, for example, would hesitate to apply an embargo without assurance that the United States would not insist on its full trading rights. To guaranteee neutrality, we have already decided to forego some of these rights, and a further extension of the materials of war list could not be considered as unfriendly by Italy. Nevertheless, we must state specifically that such action is taken in our own interest, not in co-operation with the League. Otherwise, should Italy and any of the League nations actually go to war, we should be extremely embarrassed by having prejudged the quarrel and given aid to one of the belligerents.

There may be little danger of such involvement in the present affair. Nevertheless, since observers predict more and tenser crises in the future, the state department must school itself to true neutrality. This may be merely a preliminary episode; but if and when a new Serajevo develops, good advice will be fatal. Perhaps even the most careful diplomacy will not then be able to prevent our participation, but it is certain that pious wishes cannot.