For some little time, it has been increasingly clear that post-war history is repeating prewar history. To make this point is almost to risk belaboring the obvious, but recept events continue to strengthen parallel. Inevitably, the similarities are not exact, and the analogies, or homologies, cannot be dealt with too. Literally, but nevertheless they exist.

Or the factors which operated to produce the antagonisms of pre-war Europe, the past fifteen years have seen developed in particular those of commercial rivalry in naval and military armaments. With regard to capital ships, this last competition between the major naval powers was partially curbed at Washington, but that treaty of limitation is about to expire, and the rivalry may again recover strength.

Until the present moment, however, the spirit offensive-defensive alliances between great powers, so vexing to pre-war Europe, has not arisen to trouble the waters. Now, apparently credible reports indicate that the former charming friendship between France and Russia is being restored. Amusingly enough, the moves in the game are strikingly like those from 1890 onward. First, the generals discuss military problems and an "understanding" is reached. Either concurrently or shortly afterward, this is supplemented by a political agreement. As in 1894, these preliminaries will now probably be completed by a treaty of military assistance. If France succeeds in attaining this objective, she will again have encircled Germany and Germany's potential allies. With the addition of Russia to Poland and the Little Entente, the war on two fronts may again be used successfully against Germany.

After gravely noting developments, it is difficult to suppress a certain derision at the almost indecent change in the French attitude toward Russia. With the Bolshevist success, the French loans, and others, made to czarist Russia. With the Bolshevist success, the French peasants, invested in those loans on governmental advice. Like many other governments the French firmly and righteously refused for a many years to deal with Soviet Russia. But the logic of events (and the French, it appears, pride themselves on their logic) forced the two governments to resume diplomatic relations. The threatened military recrudescence of Germany has now brought France and Russian together as effectively as did their fear of the more powerful Germany of forty-five years ago. Cassandra-like observes can only mediate on the future with a faintly dolorous apprehension.

Speculation as to the immediate products of this union, if it be consummated, may not be entirely without interest, for the ramifications of diplomacy can be ribaldly tortuous. What, for example, will be its effect on the Far Eastern question? Japan's relations with the United States, Russia, and Great Britain are at present in a state which may decorously be called difficult. With the exception of Russia, these powers as well as France are involved in the coming conference which will revise the Washington naval treaty. Concerning this, Japan has just politely indicated that she does not care to have the Chinese question on the agenda. Her recent demarche would indicate that she intends to treat it as a fait accompli. France, like the other powers, is not without Chinese interests, in Yunnan, as well as in Indo-China, and any undue increase in Japanese influence could only cause in Japanese influence could only cause uneasiness at the Quai d'Orsay.

Taking one consideration with another, it would appear that the vagaries of the nations are about to afford commentators some excellent opportunities for mordant solemnities. CONFUCIUS.