The Austrian crisis has been of but little benefit to the Germans who, to a large extent, were responsible for it, and has, in fact, left them in a much less favorable position than they occupied prior to the destruction of Vienna socialism. One power has, however, managed to do some very successful fishing in troubled waters and that power is Italy. What Italy has been able to get out of it is only now becoming apparent as the full implications of the conferences between Premier Goemboes of Hungary, Chanceller Dollfuss, and Mussolini, which start today, are seen.

Ostensibly, these conferences are held only in order to alleviate the economic plight of Austria and Hungary by the formation of more favorable trade relations with Italy; no other power, it seems, is willing to take this step which is necessary if Austrian independence is to be maintained; hence Italy has nobly and altruistically come to the rescue quite devoid of any nordid ambitions. That this is pure buncombe it is hardly necessary to point out. What has happened is simply that Mussolini has seen that this is the opportunity of a lifetime to institute a defensive alliance with Austria and Hungary, that will counterbalance the French bloc formed by the Little Entente. Moreover, this alliance can later be extended to include Turkey and Bulgaria, two powers which can naturally be counted upon to oppose the hogemony of the Little Entente in central and southern Europe. This has long been a project close to the heart of Mussolini, faced as he is by the overwhelming strength of France and her allies; but he has hitherto been prevented from realizing it by the active objections not only of France but also of Germany, and any attempt to make it a reality would not have merely called forth opposition that might quite possibly have wrecked the whole plan, but would in addition have driven France into the arms of Germany.

But all is changed now. By their stupid foreign policy the Germans have ruined any chance they might have had of preventing the formation of an Italian bloc, for if Germany opposes anything it is simply as a matter of principle, supported by the rest of the European powers. France in particular has been so completely alienated that Mussolini no longer need have any fears of a Franco-German rapprochement. He is thus able to proceed with his plans and France, far from making difficulties, tries instead to assure their success by persuading her Balkan allies not to raise any objections. There is thus presented the strange and mystifying spectacle of one alliance system actually helping the formation of another and rival system.

This indicates, I think, that in a very broad sense the appearance of Hitler as the dominant force in Germany, far from being a serious menace to the peace of Europe, has instead made the possibility of war considerably less by destroying, or at least by temporarily suspending, the threatening France-Italian rivalry, which was potentially a far more dangerous factor than the loud bawlings and moaning of Hitler. It might have precipitated a war in which the whole of Europe would again have been divided into almost equal sides, and which consequently would have become a second world war. If war does come now it will undoubtedly be a war of Germany against the rest of Europe, for Hitler has seen to it that Germany has no allies left; even Hitler, however, would hardly be imbecilic enough to face such overwhelming odds. The maintenance of the peace of Europe seems, ironically enough, to be partially guaranteed by its arch enemy, Adolf Hitler.