In June, 1830, no one suspected that by the end of the month Charles X would be fleeing from Paris and his government collapsed. A week ago not even the most optimistic royalist would have predicted that the resentment of the people at the Stavisky affair would attain its present proportions: yet yesterday, the Parisian revolt began to resemble a national revolution both in violence and in extent. A week ago the question was whether or not the Chautemps government would get a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies; today there is serious doubt if the Republic itself can survive the storm.

The crucial test will. I think, come within a few days. Up until now the mobs have been composed of many discordant elements. Socialists, Communists, Royalists, and hoodlums, plus a great many citizens out for a lark, rioting without any specific end in view. so far the police have kept the crowd under control--but only with machine guns. If all this is necessary to cow a leaderless mob, what will happen when the rioters are directed by capable leaders who know what they want? If, then, in the next few days the revolt is given some directive force, France will he faced with an organized revolution.

How far this revolution will go will depend, of course, upon what forces gain control over it. Heretofore, in France, the middle class has always managed to gain this control of the revolutions--which they had made possible--after the radical elements had done most of the fighting; this was the case in 1830, 1848, and 1870. There was, however, one factor present in those cases not duplicated today; the presence of a large body of opposition to the existing form of government, with strong, capable leaders. In France today, there are two parties which are opposed to the continuance of the Republic, the Communists and the Royalists. Of those two the Communists may be dismissed, for they have no leaders and their programme would be anathema to agrarian France. There remains, then, only the Royalists, who have a strong, well organized party and capable though not outstanding leaders. There is, however, one man who might provide the Royalists with the firm direction which they need so badly and without which they will be unable to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunity which now confronts them. That man is the heir to the throne of France, the Due de Guise; he enjoys an international reputation for firmness of character, and in France he has great prestige both as a man and as the embodiment of the monarchial tradition. The disgust of the French people with the corruption of the present irresponsible Republican regime has put them in just the mood to hearken to the benefits of a stable monarchy.

Consequently, the Royalists have a fine chance to restore France's traditional government to her, providing they can control the course of the revolt--and their success will be mainly a question of the sort of leadership they are able to offer.

If the Royalists fail, the Republic will probably be able to maintain itself if only because it represents a compromise between the various warring political factions, and because, due to the growth in the centralization of authority, the government has a much firmer hold on the country than in any of the previous revolutions. Thus the present is not likely to give birth to any very radical movement--although hovering vaguely and almost unnoticed over the scene is the shadow of Fascism and dictatorship. NEMO