The attention which was once devoted solely to the Polish Corridor has, this year, shifted spasmodically but over more frequently to the Anschluss, a term which includes almost any sort of union between Germany and Austria. Europe has been losing many hours of sleep over this question, not simply as a subject for disinterested betting as to whether or not the merger would be effected, but because its completion would undoubtedly mean war. For despite nonchalant reports to the contrary, neither France nor Italy have the slightest intention of allowing the Anschluss.

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It is not hard to deduce the reason why these two countries are so opposed to the union. Aside from the complex which both France and Italy exhibit when confronted with a proposal to cement a combination which it took four bloody years to sever, there is, as usual, a powerful economic stimulus to that prejudice. The privilege of selling to the Balkan States, old and new, is extremely valuable; and France and Italy, while rivals themselves, are as one in their determination to keep Germany's fingers as far from the pie as possible. If the Anachluss were to go through German capitalists would not only secure the Austrian market but a pivotal position in Central Europe from which to conclude commercial as well as military agreements with surrounding countries. In the small nations in question, where the dividing line between economic and political power is so minute as to be indistinguishable, trade contracts are instruments of political bargaining, and likely to go to that major nation whose "prestige" and propinquity are greatest. So, through the actual military power which would accrue to Hitler from alliance with Austria's army and industrial resources is small, yet his opportunity to muscle in on the Balkan market is too real for France and Italy to ignore.

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The position which Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss of Austria occupies in this melange is critical and interesting. As the world knows, he is the nominal bulwark against the Anschluss and its proponents, the Nazis. Keyed up by a buoyant egoism which has led him to exploit his four feet eleven inches as a little Napoleon, and supported by considerable religious fervor, he has snatched at every straw to consolidate his position. To take the wind from Nazi sails, he has become a real dictator with actually Fascist principles, though professedly an amorphous Christian Socialism. How long will he last? That he is still in office can only, I think, be regarded as inexplicably good luck. He has run afoul of the strong Vienna Socialist Party; the patriotism which he has endeavored to arouse has a weak historical basis; the pro-Anschluss sentiment seems to be growing, as the deepening depression makes an economic union appear more and more desirable; and Dollfuss' flirtations with France and England are none too popular even fifteen years after.

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The indeterminate factor, and perhaps the decisive one, is the Socialist Party. How powerful it is, one has no exact way of telling; the last elections are all but forgotten. But it may be that it is the real defence against an Anschluss, for though the Socialists hate Dollfuss, they hate the Nazis, Austrian and German, even more, and have announced their readiness to proclaim a general strike, or at the worst, civil war, if any Nazi putsch is attempted. It would be odd indeed, though not improbable, if the Little Napoleon were kept in power by the party he so despises. CASTOR.