THESE two volumes of the papers of Colonel House surpass in interest and importance even the published in 1926. With the entry of the United States into the War the Colonel became the channel of unofficial communication between the governments of the associated powers and President Wilson. By a private telephone connecting the State Department with his study in New York or Magnolia, Colonel House communicated suggestions and advice to President and Cabinet. To him rather than to the accredited diplomats turned Allied statesmen who wished Wilson's ear. "Balfour, speaking for the British Government, could get an answer from President Wilson, if necessary, within a few hours," by cabling directly to Colonel House in New York in a special British Government code.

On every phase of American participation in making war and peace these absorbing volumes throw fresh light. The tactful Texan organized The Inquiry, headed the first American War Mission, sat on the Supreme War Council with the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy, and served on the American Peace Commission. In the drafting of many of Wilson's great addresses he was consulted. The cautious student, however, will await the further publication of Wilson's papers before seeking to evaluate thte Colonel's influence. No fresh light is thrown on their separation, which remains to Colonel House "a tragic mystery . . . that now can never be dispelled, for its explanation lies buried with him."

Despite President Wilson's testimony that he had no knowledge of the secret treaties prior to the peace conference, Professor Seymour concludes "that Mr. Balfour and Colonel House discussed the secret treaties, and that in the conference with President Wilson which followed 'exactly the same ground was covered.' The question of the Far East was not raised and there is nothing to show that either Colonel House or the President knew anything of the understanding between the Allies and Japan regarding Shantung." The Colonel looked forward to the peace conference "as a good opportunity which may be lost because of the grasping, selfish interests ever ready to use such occasions for their own and their country's aggrandizement. . . . ." With regard to American loans to the associated powers, he wrote to the President in August, 1917, that "as long as we have money to lend, those wishing to borrow will be agreeable, but when the bottom of the barrel is reached, it may be a different story."