The renewal of agitation concerning the French war debt to America indicates the necessity of a solution of this portentious unknown in the international equation. Mr. Keynes, in the most recent New Republic, outlines the French view. America sacrificed her money, as France sacrificed her blood and sinew, to attain a common result. The cash and goods advanced were called a loan in order to encourage economical spending, but in the first flush of victory they should have been generously cancelled. The British view is that France should follow England's example in arranging the steps leading to ultimate payment. The American view is that these loans are collectible and due like commercial debts, and since it refused annexations or indemnities in making the peace, the United States must not consent to undergo this profitless confiscation of its capital. Justice seems to lie in each claim, and in none.

Here is an appalling commixture of cross-purposes, opposite intentions, and dense miscomprehension. The problem, in itself difficult to grasp, is inextricably dove-tailed with questions of German reparations. French public finance, allied debts to England, and American monopoly of the world's gold, and it is complicated by contrary theories of international trade. Threatening factions between the former allies cannot be overlooked. The danger of over-whelming the French government with bankruptcy is very real, for present loans are being subscribed on the assumption that the United States will not insist upon the collection of its war loans.

The future untangling of these financial skeins is dubious, yet the first steps must be taken. The attitudes of the governments must be clarified. Compromises must be effected, effects studied, and machinery devised. A path out of this international dilemma must be found, and the sooner the problem is faced, the sooner will the United States and France return, under clear and same relations, to their friendly entente.