Evidently the statements published some days ago by Mr. William B. Shearer, in regard to the present material condition of the Navy were not as pessimistic as the comment of Secretary. Wilbur would have led one to believe. The report of Admiral Robert E. Coontz, which-has just appeared, far from fulfilling Mr. Wilbur's predictions, might very well be called discouraging. While it is a long established custom for military and naval experts to wall and moan over the state of the country's armed forces, there is a dispassionate note of truth in the Commander-in-chief's report that carries conviction.

In actual combat, when outside factors were considered which did not have to do immediately with actual naval strength, it is hardly likely that the United States would compare with Japan on the water in a ratio of one to three, but there is not the slightest doubt that much of the good resulting from the Washington Conference, both to America from the letter, and to the other signatory powers from the spirit of the agreement, has been practically nullified.

As it stands now, the Arms treaty begins to appear more and more ineffectual. In limiting the number of capital ships to be built by each country, it was significant merely in demonstrating that the world was coming to realize the needless expense of international armament competition. Beyond that, it accomplished nothing; first, because almost everyone recognized that the importance of capital ships was lessening, in view of the limitless future opening to aviation; and second, because it failed to deal adequately with the matter of secondary ships, such as cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Other powers, aware of the increasing value of these classes, refused absolutely to limit or regulate their future production.

If the United States wishes to set an example to the rest of the world in refusing to enlarge its navy, with the hope that other nations will follow its lead, a decisive statement and explanation of policy is called for. Although such a step might at the present time be neither wise nor expedient, it could at least be defended; whereas the present course of action, which seems to consist of doing as little as possible, not only demoralizes the nation's sea forces, but effects this demoralization for no apparent purpose.