Senators Reed and Robinson seem to regard the Four-Power Treaty as a conspiracy concocted by England and Japan for their mutual advantage. But the fact remains that America also was represented at the Conference and that the American delegation thought fit to sign the document. It doesn't matter who wrote it; the important thing is what it says.

The signatories are bound by the Treaty in only two ways. If there should develop between any of them "a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights (in the Pacific) which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy", they promise to submit the whole subject to a joint conference of the signatories for "consideration and adjustment." Surely this is no dangerous innovation in American foreign policy. The score or more Bryan arbitration treaties pledge us to almost the same course. It is said that the Senate gave to them, in executive session, its unanimous approval! And the nation has approved ever since.

In the second place, the Treaty provides that if the Pacific rights of the signatories are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power, the signatories "shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measured to be taken, jointly and separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation." There is no unconditioned guarantee of territorial integrity. We are bound only to "communicate"; after that we can do as we like.

The most important feature of the Treaty in the eyes of Senator Lodge--one which Senator Reed confessed yesterday he had "overlooked"--is the provision which terminates the Anglo-Japanese Alliance when ratifications of this Treaty are-exchanged. The Alliance has undoubtedly been the cause of much ill-feeling and suspicion. It has been played up by certain American papers and used to foster hatred of both signatories. Its abrogation would do much to clear the air in the Pacific.

Japan is without question a gainer by the Treaty, obtaining, besides much prestige, such security for her possessions as the provisions already quoted indicate. But the other powers gain in this way also; all four can feel that their lands in the Pacific are safer. In this fact lies the central importance of the Four-Power Treaty; it lessons the need for naval armament. If it fails, says Senator Lodge, disarmament will fail. As soon as certain of the Senators can make up their minds as to whether the treaty is good or bad--despite the undeniable handicap of not knowing who wrote it--the mere process of ratifying it should not take long.