". . . As a result of this examination, it has been found impossible to escape the conclusion that the prospective conference is not merely an economic conference . . . but it is rather a conference of political character in which the government of the United States could not helpfully participate." With these words Secretary Hughes succinctly states the chief reason for our staying out of the Genoa Conference. The stand is justified. Almost from the time of the first suggestion of holding an economic parley have politics entered into the plan. Past events indicate that England is desirous of using the Genoa meeting as a medium for introducing Russia, industrially at least, to the great powers. Lloyd George and Briand bartered for France's consent to join the conference, the British Premier having as a club the treaty for protecting France and guaranteeing Belgium in case of any attack by a foreign power.

The fact that Briand, after agreeing to the conference, immediately found it necessary to resign plainly indicates France's attitude. M. Poincare has insisted on omitting from the agenda any discussion of land armaments; this plainly nullifies much that might have been accomplished, for until European governments can find a way to limit their expenses to their incomes, economic rehabilitation is impossible. Nor is Germany over-enthusiastic; Rathenau's speeches have constantly been criticised--Der Tag, the industrial organ, for one, says: "What warrant has Herr Rathenau in assuming that the nations of the world, including the United States, are about to organize an economic entente? Where are the indications that America is contemplating increased interest in the sorrows of Europe, or that it will succeed in influencing French politics?"

Russia, of course, strongly favors the conference. She has nothing to lose, and may gain something. Lenin has expressed a desire to go to Genoa and meet Lloyd George "face to face". It would appear that these gentlemen have forgotten the lesson of the Paris Conference, and overlook the success achieved (barring the U. S. Senate) by the Arms Conference, by having delegates from governments and not chiefs of governments represent the various nations

Sir Phillip Gibbs recently predicted that, without the United States, the Genoa parley would be a failure. When one considers that the most important nations now left to confer are themselves divided on the point of wanting a conference its success seems jeopardized. When further, any consideration of rearranging German reparations and balancing of budgets of some of the nations are not to be discussed, it is difficult to comprehend how any progress can be made.

The attitude of the United States Government, however, is not in any doubt. There are a great many things which Europe must and can do by herself before any "assistance" from this country can truly be called assistance. Europe must settle her political disputes and live within her income before official action by our government can result in anything but harm for her, and for us.