This is the eleventh of a series of articles which the Crimson is running on the Disarmament Conference at Washington, and the fourth of the weekly summaries of developments which will be printed.

When to weeks had elapsed without an open session of the Armament Conference there were signs of impatience and suspicion among those who were eager for news of its doings. It seemed to some of these that decisions has been unnecessarily delayed, and to others that perhaps there were sinister influences at work to prevent any real decision whatever. This impatience, if not the suspicion, was natural even though not quite reasonable.

Among the chief delegates of the principal Powers, however, the feeling was of quite the opposite character. The impetus which the Conference received by the introduction of a detailed plan for the limitation of naval armaments started the deliberations forward at great speed. Within ten days great decisions affecting naval and far Eastern polices were reached and recorded. These decision meant the acceptance of certain broad but definite principles. The issues has been presented in such a way that the choice before the delegates was virtually one between Yes and No. In the study of the proposals there was of course some labor required, but it was not such as to consume much time, and of course it was hastened by the natural desire of every delegation not to seem to hesitate over an answer to a categorical question.

The greater part of the labor needed to formulate the issues had been done before the delegations had convened. For further decision, however, applying these accepted principle to details further study, including investigation by experts, was required and, after that, extended discussion. Facts regarded by one power as established naturally would not be accepted by another Power except upon verification and comparison with other facts. For example, the American method of computing displacement tonnage differs from the British method and the Japanese method. Questions were raised that could not be answered without reference to facts not obtainable in this country. For example, the date for the withdrawal of Japanese post offices from Chinese soil could not be fixed until the Japanese delegates could get from Tokio and official estimate of the time it would take to make the necessary transfer.

Some of the questions are so related to others that an answer could not always be made without consideration of the effect that the answer would have on issues not yet settled. For example, whether under discussion or not the effect that a final and detailed agreement on novel armament would have upon the fortification of naval bases has certainly had to be considered by the delegates and their experts. Charged with the duty of preserving the true interests of there respective countries, the delegates could not properly make their decisions without taking time to discuss and to think.

Because of the expectations aroused by the speed standard set at the beginning of the Conference, the delegates have been working under a nervous pressure not altogether conducive to careful deliberation. They are subjected to this pressure by the publicity of the proceedings; they are daily made aware of the desire of the press for news of progress; but they know they must not allow themselves to be hurried in reaching decisions that are going to affect the destiny of nations.

Though all three of the delegations concerned with the question of stopping the naval competition--the American, the British, and the Japanese--disclaim any intention of holding up a final decision on that mater until the policy of the nations toward the Far East us stadium it has become increasingly evident that naval armament cannot be limited altogether apart from questions of national policy.

Japan Vitally interested in East

japan, in particular, whose spokesman at first, before the Conference began, made public their willingness, if not preference, to have naval armaments limited without reference to any settlement of disputes over the Far East, has found that the limitation of naval armament as presented in the form of the Hughes proposal will vitally affect her status as an Asiatic power, unless she knows what the policy of other Powers are toward conditions that touch what she feels to be her national security. She has made this plain by proposing, though not officially and publicly, the relative naval power be determined not by the tonnage of battle fleets, which can be definitely measured, but the indefinite and un-measurable test of the necessities of defense. For this reason there has been already injected into the consideration (though, I understand, not into the official discussions) of the Conference the question of Japan's position on the mainland across the Sea of Japan--that is Manchuria and Siberia.

has Strategic Positions

At the cost of wars, engaged in when she regarded her future existence as threatened, Japan secured on the mainland strategic positions which she is determined not to abandon. At the same time she has discovered that access to the raw materials of the mainland is necessary to enter here into the question whether her population has grown beyond the capacity of the islands to support it. The fact is that Japan, like all other civilized countries, is engaged in developing an industrial life. She does not want to be deprived of the natural advantage here geographical position gives her.

At the same time the other industrial nations, and particularly the United States, are interested in preventing any nation from establishing a monopoly of privilege in what is certainly one of the richest undeveloped regions of the world. It is urged on behalf of Japan that she seeks no such monopoly, and yet the experience of Americans and others not Japanese indicates that Japan has used here possessions in Manchuria (including her railway rights) so as to discourage competition with Japanese traders, and that she his not hesitated to use military force to gain a position in Siberia that will lead to friction and even hostilities when Russia revives.

Question of Open Door

The Open Door in Asia means the open door in Manchuria and Siberia. The problem is so the leave the door open to commerce as not to provide an open way to Japan for some future enemy. A true Monroe Doctrine for Japan would entitle her to safety but not to an aggressive military policy or to economic special privilege. The Armament Conference is based on the same principle as the Open Door; and the Open Door hinges in Manchuria. In respect to both armament and the Far, East the purpose of the assembly of delegates at Washington is to substitute conference and co-operation for a scramble and a fight.

Intrinsically less important than the question of Manchuria, is the question of Shantung. Though technically only a very small part to the province of Shantung is at stake, and the right of Japan there form a very strong case in international law, circumstances have made it a moral issue in public opinion with a strong appeal on behalf of China. Naturally to Chinese want the case kept before the court of public opinion, while the Japanese prefer to have the case settled out of court.

For this reason the Chinese have refused to accept Japan's proposal to rash a decision by "direct negotiations". Such a controversy was necessarily a hindrance to any program towards mutual understanding at the Conference. Fortunately both China and Japan accepted the "got offices" of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour in arranging a series of discussions of the matter in the presence of the American and British "observers". At the first of the conversations, the Japanese spokesman took advantage of the occasion in his speech of thanks to Mr. Hughes and Mr. Baleful to refer to the meetings as "direct negotiations", thus by obvious implication claiming a victory at the outset for Japan.

This reflection, which the Chinese representative courteously ignored, then to influence the minds of the Chinese students, who form a distinct and influential factor in Chinese affairs. In Washington some of these students have demonstrated against the continuance of the conversations. Nevertheless the Chinese representatives have proceeded with the discussions about the table, relying, for public appeal, upon the presence of the observers and the ultimate report on the subject to the Conference.

Precedent for Future Conferences

In the fourth week of the Conference it is too early to reach any definite conclusion as to any future provision which may be made for continuing as a practice this example of international action. That this Conference will from a precedent for future conferences there seems to be little doubt. From official sources there has come no indication of any intention to form an organization to guarantee anything. Whatever compulsion is anticipated to secure the fulfillment of agreements here made seems to be not that which has its analogy in police power but that which has its analogy in business credits