Displaying a fierce and tireless offence, the Freshman soccer team defeated the Andover Academy eleven 5-0 in the first game of the 1925 season on Soldiers Field yesterday afternoon. It was only in the last part of the second period that the Blue team threatened, and then clever guarding by the Freshmen successfully held them in check.

It took the 1925 players only five minutes to pierce the Academy defence for the first tally, L. J. Barnes, the fast left outside, driving the ball into the visitors' net on a fast pass from A. W. Samborshi. Shortly afterward J. F. terested in the future of China and in naval disarmament. Two of the former Allied and Associated Powers, France and Italy, are occupied almost exclusively with European disorder and will subordinate their policy during the Conference to their national interests in Europe. Two of the other three, the United States and Japan, will approach the problems of power and policy in the Pacific as a matter which demands special consideration on its own merits. Great Britain occupies an intermediate position between the two groups and her attitude will have much to do with the success or failure of the gathering.

The presence in the Conference of two or possibly three Powers who will subordinate their treatment of the problems of the Pacific to European interests gravely endangers its success in accomplishing the object of its authors. The French delegation in particular will insist on discusing at length the limitation of land armaments in relation to the existing causes of unrest and insecurity in Europe. Its policy with respect to political and military problems of the Pacific may serve only as stock-in-trade which it can barter in exchange for advantages nearer at home. But if European perplexities dominate the deliberations of the Conference, it will come to a stop in front of the embittered conflicts of national interest which defeated Mr. Wilson in Paris and with which the statesmanship of the present administration is not prepared to deal. The Conference will have small chance of success unless the American delegation can manage not only to fasten the attention of the gathering on the Pacific and on naval disarmament but also somehow to have the problems of the Pacific disinterestedly considered on their own merits.

Hard to Test Success of Conference

Let us suppose the American government by virtue of diplomatic co-operation with Great Britain clears this initial obstacle, formidable as it is, and fastens the attention of the Conference on a fairly objective consideration of the causes of international disorder and conflict in the Pacific in relation to the competition in naval armaments. What would in that event constitute a fair yard-stick of its success? Should we test it by the volume of naval disarmament upon which Japan, Great Britain and the United States would agree? Or should we test it by the extent to which it permanently adjusts existing conflicts of national policy in China and creates a concert of Pacific Powers based on the loyal acceptance by all of them of certain common principles and methods in their treatment of China?

In my opinion the second will constitute a sounder yard-stick of success than the first. The Conference will and should accomplish something under both heads. It will almost certainly arrange for at least a temporary reduction in naval expenditures by Japan, Great Britain, the United States. A failure in this respect might well be fatal to President Harding, It would disappoint the public and damage the prestige of the administration to such an extent that the American delegation will avoid it at any cost. The Conference is also likely to draw up a form of words about the policy of foreign nations towards China, which Japan, Great Britain and the United States will all accept. But this form of words will need cross-examination. It will need searching for convenient ambiguities and dangerous jokers. The diplomatic history of the Far East is a jungle of ambiguous and insincere phrases. The questions must be asked: What does the new formula really mean? Does it provide for the operative administration of its decrees? Will the Conference recognize by its legislation, that a mere limitation of naval armaments without an effective working agreement about the future of China may help Japan to exploit China rather than the United States to protect China against exploitation?

The limitation of armaments is important, but it is not decisive as an agency of peace. National armament is the creature of national policy. If a nation cherishes policies which impair the freedom and prevent the development of other nations, it is bound to arm in self-protection against the resentment and the fear of other nations. It may agree temporarily to limit its armament, provided those who suffer from its aggression or are opposed to its pretensions agree to a similar limitation. But in that event disarmament is an advantage to the aggressor. It frees his hand. The helplessness of China has provided her aggressors with their opportunity. In the end she must manage to protect herself, but in the meantime those who understand the disastrous consequences of leaving her open to exploitation must provide for her protection. They cannot provide her with protection unless they are armed. But neither can they provide sufficiently for her protection merely by arming. Chinese independence like Korean independence might be as much endangered by a successful protector as by a successful exploiter. A nation which wishes honestly to protect another nation against exploitation will do what the American government is trying to do. It will use its armaments as a diplomatic tool with which to induce other nations to place the possible victim under effective international guaranties--guaranties which will bind America no less than Japan.

But if a peace-loving statesman fails to obtain the guarantee, he will not delude himself with the idea that by disarming he has protected China, diminished the occasion for future war or promoted the security of the world. The Administration has done well to associate the proposal to limit naval armaments with the proposal to do away with one of the chief reasons for their existence. It would not do well to insist on the limitation without having succeeded in securing its regional international agreement. The public should test its work by its success in eradicating the causes of international fear, hostility and disorder in the Pacific. Its business is to provide for the future protection of China by an agreement among the Pacific Powers which will have as its chief purpose the building up of a strong and self-supporting China. If it can accomplish this result, a substantial part of the existing naval armament would become unnecessary. It would then be easy to limit navies and far harder in the future to increase them. If it cannot accomplish this result any limitation of armament achieved by the coming Conference would be precarious. In a disorderly country where there is no security of person and property, men will carry guns. The western Pacific would remain as essentially disorderly as it has been during the past twenty-five years. Its inhabitants would need armaments for their own protection. The present agitation in favor of disarmament which is prompted as much by poverty as by any devotion to justice and peace would be superseded and its results neutralized by another successful campaign for military and naval preparedness