(The Crimson invites all men in the University to submit signed communications of timely interest. It assumes no responsibility, however, for sentiments expressed under this head and reserves the right to exclude any whose publication would be palpably inappropriate.)

To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

One point in the discussion of the retention of American troops in Siberia deserves more consideration than it has hitherto received. That is the relation of those troops to Japanese policy.

There is in Japan a considerable body of opinion which sees in Siberia a most desirable field for expansion. The country is rich in natural resources, and the population is small, in many ways it is the best opportunity now open for the extension of Japanese possessions. Japanese statesmen have on occasion given expression to this ambition.

While American troops are in Siberia it is difficult for the Japanese to take any action toward the absorption of this territory. If however, American troops are withdrawn, Japan is given a free hand, and can excuse almost any act on the ground of the necessity of securing Siberia against the Bolsheviki. The chances are excellent that we should shortly find that Japan had assumed the same relation toward Siberia that England held toward Egypt fifteen years ago--or that Japan herself once held toward Korea.

In this connection it is interesting to not that while the American strength in Siberia is in the neighborhood of 7000 men, the Japanese had, according to the last figures which I have seen, some five divisions.

From all this let us simply conclude with the hope that when well-meaning Americans agitate for the withdrawal of our troops from Siberia, they will do it bearing clearly in mind what that withdrawal is likely to involve. Personally, were I a Bolshevik, I should be strongly in favor of keeping American troops in Siberia; or, on the other hand, were I a Japanese, I should be strongly in favor of their withdrawal. C. P. WINSOR '17