(We invite all men in the University to submit communications on subjects of timely interest, but assume no responsibility for sentiments expressed under this head.)

To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

In view of the widespread and persistent failure to understand the position of those who argue for the maintenance of our neutrality in connection with the crisis in our relations with Germany, it seems fitting to reiterate a few of the more important reasons for this course of action. These are based on an estimate of the entire maritime situation, as opposed to a consideration of the maritime warfare waged solely by one of the belligerents--unfortunately the view on which are based, apparently, the conclusions of the majority of those who undertake to judge Germany's submarine warfare. The proverbial American spirit of fair play would seem to warrant the application of a single standard of judgment to the conduct of the two belligerents whose present methods of warfare are affecting the vital interests of the United States on the sea. But if this attitude be taken, a resort to arms, by way of vindicating America's rights, is manifestly impossible, since we should be obliged to challenge practically the whole of Europe. Granting that Germany, by her submarine warfare, is contravening the principles of international law, what shall we say of the Orders in Council issued by the British Admiralty, whereby neutral cargoes of non-contraband goods are seized, in spite of the solemn guarantees of the Declaration of London, in which England and other signatories bound themselves to respect the non-contraband character of such goods? The recognition of the restrictions which would be imposed on American trade and passenger traffic if we were to "take orders from Germany" should not blind us to a realization of our acquiescence, voluntary or enforced, in the orders of the British Admiralty, whereby commerce and passenger traffic between Germany and the United States are completely cut off--and this in spite of the ineffectiveness of the Entente blockade along the Baltic coast of Germany. Again, how shall we condone the affront to our national honor represented by the constant rifling of our mails, in violation of one of the most sacred principles of international law?

We should not allow our partiality for the cause of the Entente so to obscure our vision as to induce us to accept as valid wholly sophistical distinctions based on mere surface factors. Critics of Germany's submarine warfare constantly stress the fact that, whereas Great Britain's Orders in Council result merely in financial loss to the United States, Germany's warfare, on the other hand, is aimed at the lives of American citizens. Let us examine, for a moment, this contention. Germany declares, to be sure, that the lives of Americans entering the recently established war zone are thereby endangered, and repudiates all respon- sibility for their safety. But have we forgotten that it was the British Admiralty which, in November, 1914, took the initiative in debarring the citizens of neutral nations from a portion of the European waters by setting aside a zone in the North Sea which, having been strewn with mines, neutrals were informed they would enter at their own risk? Suppose an American merchant vessel or passenger liner should decline to submit to such dictation, or, while engaged in non-contraband trade, en route for Hamburg or Bremen, or for some neutral European port, refused to regard the warning shot fired from a British vessel intent on its capture. In either case, would not American lives be sacrificed, or at least endangered?

It is only this prohibition, in a slightly different form, which Germany seeks to exercise upon American shipping. As regards the use of mines, both belligerents are now obviously on an equal footing, as any specific warning in connection with the use of this species of weapon is, of course, out of the question. As regards the employment of her submarines, Germany, instead of withholding her threat until the moment of capture, as is the British practice, gives warning in advance that any vessel entering the prescribed area does so at its own risk. At the same time she mitigates the rigor of this decree by providing a restricted sea-lane which may be used by American passenger vessels with impunity. This restriction constitutes, to be sure, a decided handicap; but one can only ask: "What regard has the British Admiralty shown, during the course of the war, for the rights or convenience of Americans on the seas? One naturally feels prompted to ask further: "If the loss of American lives, resulting from our insistence on entering the war-zone established around the sea-coast of the Entente Powers, constitutes a casus belli, why may we not put into practice the sound policy embodied in the ill-fated McLemore Resolution, tabled, contrary to the best conviction of the majority of our Congressmen in response to dictatorial party pressure brought to bear upon them? In thus warning our citizens off belligerent vessels our Government would be acting not only in conformity to the practice of Sweden during this war, but also in harmony with the precedent established by Great Britain herself during the Russo-Japanese war, when the Admiralty disavowed responsibility for the lives of citizens who should take passage on the vessels of either belligerent.

Finally, are we justified in asserting that national honor requires that we should plunge into war with Germany in view of the example set by the five neutral nations of Europe, whose sense of honor not only does not dictate an appeals to arms, but does not even demand the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany?  KENNETH G. DARLING 2G