The next few months are likely to be the most critical period of the war for the United States. The first stages of preparation are over. We have drafted and sent to training camps a half million men who must be disciplined into an army; we have voted enormous appropriations for war equipment and extended large credits to our allies; and we have reorganized our governmental machinery to protect and promote increased production.

But these have been the easy things. Washington is a small part of the country. It represents the few but able men upon whom the people have shouldered the responsibilities of carrying on the war. The first six months have shown altruly remarkable accomplishment on their part. It is only now that the great mass of the public is being confronted with the burdens it must bear and the sacrifices it must make. Winter is coming on; food and fuel are unusually scarce; prices are rising; casualty lists may soon be published. The demands upon our time and money have greatly increased; it is absolutely essential that we contribute liberally to the many forms of war aid and that we loan to the government, through the purchase of Liberty Bonds all the capital for which it asks.

As the shoe begins to pinch, certain factors should be held in mind. France has been unbelieveably bled, and is probably continuing to fight chiefly because of our entrance into the war. But until next spring aid from the United States is more likely to be potential than effective, and therefore much depends upon our attitude and our actions until that time. If France can rely upon us to put ourselves unreservedly into the conflict at the earliest possible moment she will continue to fight on.

In the meantime there are unquestionably strong forces at work beneath the surface to bring about an early peace. As it becomes clearer to all concerned that a military decision is not to be expected in the near future, peace tends to become more a political than a military question. The problem of offering a more exact statement of our war aims assumes new interest. The many long and weary months of war are bound to cause a shifting of emphasis from the immaterial ideal with which we entered the war to the material results of victory. We are more apt to stress the importance of winning or losing a few miles of shell torn fields in northern France than of preventing the formation of a Mitteleuropa. Casualty lists and the first complaints at heavy taxes will deaden our interest in a possibly far-distant victory. Yet whether we believe in a military decision, or in a peace without victory as the solution of the war, we must make our aid to the Allies as effective as possible now. It is only by holding to our original objects in entering the war that we can prevent the natural feeling or a lessened enthusiasm, and come safely through the critical period of the coming months.