In the January issue of Outing is presented the annual football Roll of Honor and a review of the past season. The former contains a total of 101 names of the leading players, all the men on the list having been named by two or more coaches. Sixteen of these occupied similar positions last season. There are five University players on the list, Mahan, Gilman, King, Soucy, and Harte. There are some inconsistencies in the compilation; for instance, although it is stated that Watson is a better field general than Barrett of Cornell, his name is left out of the list, which contains the names of ten quarterbacks. In the review of the season Outing says:

"The general lesson of the year is that the running attack is at last firmly grounded and developed, despite the gloomy prophecies of three years ago that touchdowns were now impossible between fairly matched teams. To be sure, the problem is squarely up to the quarterback. He must not only have the plays but also the brains to use them. Each game is a problem in itself. With a heavy team having great endurance he may count on their coming harder and faster straight through. If his attack is based largely on speed and deception, he must make his scoring bids before the backs have begun to slow up or the defence has solved the fakes.

"Princeton employed a useful combination of line thrusts and runs off tackle, but there was little deception and the mixture was not always a happy one. The best exemplification of the fast running alert attack shown in the East was furnished by Harvard and Colgate. The latter team, however, suffered from the lack of a quarterback who had mastered the art of playing the concertina with the defence.

"Offensive kicking had its fine flower at Princeton, especially in the earlier games. Driggs seemed to suffer from nervousness in the Harvard and Yale games, and was not placing his punts as well as in the previous games. For Harvard Mahan was always a power with his right foot. Here the kicking game was well mixed with a run from kick formation that was always useful either in action or as a threat with a man like Mahan behind the line.

"For once Yale does not present much that is of value save certain lessons as to what not to do. The play as seen in action was sluggish and often stupid and showed a surprising lack of football knowledge. The Yale line had strength which was largely wasted in straight heaves of the old-fashioned sort. Here again a lesson may be learned from Harvard. The Harvard line play is a thrust rather than a heave. On defence the lineman is intent on getting through as soon as possible instead of carrying his opponent back with him. This enables him to get into the elcar where he can see the play, and gives him a chance to cut down the interference and to hurry the play. The thrust is diagonal rather than direct. Even on plays through the line the defence is thus enabled to avoid being smothered. The same general principle applies in attack. With a quick-starting backfield that is coming in standing up, it is not necessary to rub your opponent in the dirt. A quick thrust to throw him out of the play and leave the offensive forward free to go through to the secondary is the sound method.

"In kicks the best method seems to be a simplification of the covering lineup for the kicker, allowing him to protect himself in part by taking position well back, leaving the forwards free to check for an instant and then sift through and go down the field. In the case of Princeton there were frequently five or more men down the field under kicks to bottle up the catcher. There is little use in protecting the kicker if the man at the other end of the punt is to be allowed to run it back 20 yards every time.

"The demands of the modern game is more for speed, speed in the backfield, speed at the ends, speed even in the line. But this is not the kind of speed that has been worshipped too often in the past. It means quick starting, quick turning, a quick choosing of the opening that promises extra yardage, the ability to keep one's feet in a broken field, and always to think at least two yards ahead of one's feet. A ten-second man is useful if he can be taught these other things, but a ten-second man is not necessary to make a successful halfback. Another point in the modern game is the necessity of the interference putting out as many men as possible. If the runner is where he should be, especially in plays off tackle, a single impact should be enough to put the first defence out of play. This impact should leave the interferer on his feet ready to hit another man. In tandem interference this rule is absolute."