Colonel Henry Stone was the lecturer on the above subject in the historical course last evening. The audience which had gathered in Sanders was well repaid by the lecture, which was the most graphic and life-like of the whole Civil War series. The lecturer opened with a brief sketch of the commanders of the opposing armies which fought in the campaign he described, Gen. Thomas the Federal commander, and Gen. Hood of the Confederates. The outcome of this campaign, which lasted from October to the end of December, 1864, was of the greatest importance, for Sherman had cut loose from the north on his march to the sea, the presidential election was approaching and only scattered bodies lay between Hood and the Ohio river, when that general, having ceased his opposition to Shaman's movements, determined to capture Nashville. His plan was to surprise that city before it could be reinforced. and then march to Virginia and help Lee annihilate Grant before Sherman could come to the latter's relief. The plan was a brilliant one, and had he moved at once nothing would have been in his way. He delayed when delay was fatal. Thomas, who had been placed in command of two corps and some scattered garrisons to guard a long line of communication, was ordered to neutralize and check this movement of Hood. But the troops of Thomas when Hood began his direct march on Nashville, was scattered. Part were watching Hood and delaying his march, while the remainder were hurrying towards the headquarters. Schoolfield, with the advance, equal to half of Hood's army, slowly retreated, and such was the generals want of care that several times the Federals were almost cut off by the rebel cavalry marching past their flank. At Columbia and Spring Hill skirmishes took place, and then Schofield quickly withdrew to Franklin, a town only a few miles south of Nashville. Here he drew up and awaited the enemy. His line was thin and the seven divisions had broken them in when a timely charge by Gen. Opdyck's brigade saved the day. Gen. Opdycke will be remembered as the last lecturer in this course. The enemy were repulsed, and that night Schofield retired to the trenches in front of Nashville.

The defenses of Nashville were strong, and Thomas had received additional reinforcement. These causes forced Hool to draw up his army in a strong position opposite the Federal left front. Here he waited. Meanwhile Thomas had refitted and organized his strengthen army, and by the 14th of December was ready to take the offensive. He made a plan and on the next day moved forward. His attack was a wheeling movement to turn Hood's left while he kept his right and centre busy in front. Gallant charges captured some of the enemy's works, and before Hood saw what was the real danger, it was too late. Simultaneous charges break his line and capture many men, and by evening his army was in full and disorderly retreat. Thomas followed up the advantage till dark and then pressed his army forward for a renewed attack on the 16th. Hood had gathered his forces into a still stronger position during the night and awaited another attack behind substantial breastworks. By noon Thomas' army was again in position, and the cavalry had moved around and captured one of the two lines for Hood's retreat. Thomas now planned a flanking movement similar to that of the day previous by which he would gradually cut off the other turnpike road in the Confederate rear. This would compel the army of Hood to surrender en masse. That he did not fully succeed was due to the incompetence and slowness of subordinates.

After the failure in of a charge on one flank another in a different quarter was more successful, and a footing was gained in the enemy's line. Other attacks followed and rapidly division after division of the army broke and fled to the rear. The whole Confederate army was soon flying in complete rout along a single road with the cavalry and one corps in pursuit. This pursuit continued through heavy weather until Hood was safe beyond the Tennessee river. The losses at the two battles of Franklin and Nashville were nearly as follows: Federals over 2,000, Confederates 6,200 at Franklin; at Nashville Thomas lost 2,900. The killed and wounded of Hood's men were never counted, but he lost 8,000 prisoners, 72 guns and 42 colors. In short, his army was a complete wreck and never accomplished anything further. Despite Hoods assertion to the contrary, the armies in the battle at Nashville were about equal. Thomas had a few thousand more men, but Hood was defended by works.

The descriptions of Colonel Stone were very picturesque. Multifarious charges and silent and hasty, as well as disorderly retreats were given with considerable vividness. The system and arrangement of maps was very good and the evening passed very pleasantly.